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FOREWORD 
The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs has established interdisci-
plinary research on policy problems as the core of its educational program. A 
major part of this program is the nine-month policy research project, in the 
course of which two or three faculty members from different disciplines 
direct the research of ten to twenty graduate students of diverse backgrounds 
on a policy issue of concern to an agency of government. This "client orien-
tation" brings the students face to face with administrators , legislators, and 
other officials active in the policy process, and demonstrates that research in a 
policy environment demands special talents. It also illuminates the occasional 
difficulties of relating research findings to the world of political realities. 
Occasionally a project of broad scope will generate enough information for 
more than one volume. Four volumes on topics related to welfare reform and 
the income maintenance system have resulted from the research conducted 
in 1977-78 for the Texas Department of Human Resources. These topics 
range from an analysis of the impact of the Carter welfare reform proposals 
on the existing system, to an examination of historical and legislative yrece-
dents, to analyses of contemporary relevant issues. In combination, the 
volumes provide a comprehensive view of a complex and vital policy area. 
It is the intention of the LBJ School both to develop men and women 
with the capacity to perform effectively in public service and to produce 
research which will enlighten and inform those already engaged in the policy 
process. The project which resulted in this report has helped to accomplish 
the former; it is our hope and expectation that the report itself will contribute 
to the latter. 
Elspeth Rostow 
Dean 
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PREFACE 
The four-volume Welfare Reform Project Report results from policy 
research conducted by the LBJ School of Public Affairs during the 1977-78 
academic year. It was supported in part by the Texas Department of Human 
Resources (OHR) and had the twin goals of assisting the Department in 
meeting its future staff needs for policy analysts and providing LBJ School 
students the opportunity to work hand-in-hand with public and private sector 
officials in developing, assessing, and implementing policies and programs in 
the human services area. The specific task was to aid OHR in developing and 
testing an independence-fostering approach to the delivery of public 
assistance and employment services. The Family Independence Plan (FIP), as 
conceived by OHR officials, was the approach developed and refined during 
the course of the research activities reported on herein. FIP is a comprehen-
sive service delivery mechanism for overcoming barriers that reduce services 
under existing entitlement programs. A key objective of the welfare reform 
project was to develop a fundable proposal for field testing, administering, 
and evaluating a demonstration FIP program . 
The scope of income maintenance policies and programs required project 
participants to familiarize themselves with a number of topics in order to 
place "welfare reform" in perspective and to develop alternative approaches 
such as the FIP. The four-volume report reflects the broad scope of our work. 
Volumes I and II provide background information and analyses that are 
essential if one is to offer substantive welfare reform alternatives. Volume III 
contains analyses of three issues that have particular relevance for Texas. 
Volume IV describes in detail the FIP concept. It also contains the FIP 
proposal as well as the evaluation design for the demonstration project . 
Additionally , a number of support documents and materials were prepared by 
project members in refining program concepts and guidelines for the FIP, 
including demographic and labor profiles of the proposed test sites. The four 
volumes are : 
I. "Linking the Carter Welfare Reform Package to the Income 
Maintenance System" 
II . "Income Maintenance Policy : An Analysis of Historical and 
Legislative Precedents" 
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III. "Analyses of Contemporary Welare Reform Issues: Sexual In-
equities; Regionalism and Fiscal Relief; and Undocumented 
Aliens' Impact on theWelfare System" 
IV. "The Family Independence Plan: An Alternative Welfare Re-
form Approach" 
Many individuals and agencies assisted in this effort. The Research team 
expresses its appreciation for their time, especially the DHR staff. 
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SEXUAL INEQUITIES: 
WELFARE REFORM AS IT AFFECTS WOMEN 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Current welfare policy is based on the outmoded concept of woman's 
inherent dependency upon man. It ignores the egalitarian goal of making each 
person, regardless of sex, totally capable of self-sufficiency. In light of the 
changes in women's roles and in society's view of women, present welfare 
policy and proposed alternatives must be cleansed of inequities based on 
obsolete perceptions regarding over fifty percent of the population. 
The number of women employed outside the home doubled between 1950 
and 1974.1 Over the last decade, the incidence of female-headed families has 
increased ten times faster than that of two-parent families ~ 2 Yet, in 1973, 
when families headed by women were twelve percent of all families, they 
constituted forty-five percent of all low-income families. 3 These facts compel 
examination of welfare policy as it affects women. Due to limitations of time 
and space, this analysis does not specifically treat the effects of past and 
proposed welfare systems on men. However, it is written with the recognition 
that the assumptions of women 's dependency upon men has naturally worked 
to the detriment of men as well as women. As long as discrimination, explicit 
or implicit, remains a reality in government policy, no one attains the goals of 
an egalitarian society. 
The main tenet of this analysis is that every persori should be afforded an 
equal opportunity to develop his/her full potential and to seek self-suffici-
ency. Furthering this tenet in welfare policy depends upon maximizing a 
person's freedom of choice regarding life style, occupation, childbirth, and 
marriage. 
The recommendations included in this paper are based upon the premise 
of neutrality-that government policy should not affect fundamental personal 
decisions-and upon the premise that a person's sex should not affect his/her 
participation in a program aimed at enhancing and increasing self-sufficiency. 
Briefly stated, we recommend the following: 
• elimination of the principal earner provision of the Program for 
Better Jobs and Income (PBJI); 
• elimination of the work requirement of PBJI; 
• explicit affirmative action regulations in the jobs component of PBJI; 
• quality child care for program participants; 
• increased emphasis on part-time and flexitime job opportunities; 
• the computation of child support as earned income rather than as 
unearned income; 
3 
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• comprehensive statistical collection and reporting by government 
agencies to facilitate measurement of program impacts upon women; 
• guaranteed continued state supplementation of income support; and 
• the use of gender-neutral concepts and language in all government 
proposals, regulations, and guidelines. 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been commonly assumed that women work for something other 
than economic need; that women, because they appear dependent upon men, 
don't necessarily need to work; that if they do work, it is not necessary for 
them to make as much money as men; and .that women are inherently the 
childrearers of society. Political rhetoric aside, these assumptions have found 
their way into governmental policy, compounding in many instances the 
effects of social and psychological inertia that reinforce the traditional roles 
of and myths about women. 
The myth that women generally rely on men for their economic support 
and the underlying assumption that women work for reasons other than 
economic need is simply not true. In 1973, two-thirds of all working women 
were divorced, separated, single, or married to men making less than $7 ,000 a 
year. 4 Figures for 19765 reflected that same truth- that many women either 
provi(ed sole support for their families or contributed to a marginal family 
income. In light of the increasing number of women choosing to remain single 
and the soaring divorce rate, the myth that women rely upon men for their 
economic support is untenable. 
The age-old assumption that the woman is the parent fully responsible for 
childrearing tends to keep many women in the home, out of the work place, 
and economically dependent upon men. In March 1976, 56.3 percent of 
working female-headed families had children under six years of age.6 In 1974, 
6.1 million children under six had mothers in the labor force. 7 Although the 
number of women in the labor force increases, the aforementioned 
assumptions represent values that restrict women's expectations and discour-
age their active participation in the economic system. Due to this limited 
access, many women cannot achieve self-sufficiency and are thereby left to 
depend either on a man or on the government for support. 
Welfare policy is the government's response to those persons in society 
who are unable to support themselves in the economic system. If the 
long-range goal of welfare policy is to encourage self-sufficiency, support 
policy which continues to reflect and thereby perpetuate dependency is an 
inherent contradiction. To eliminate this contradiction, welfare policy must 
be neutral in theory and in implementation. 
A neutral policy is one which does not influence a person's choice 
4 
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concerning such fundamental decisions as marriage, childbirth, family 
composition, or occupation, regardless of sex.8 Neutrality is a necessary 
philosophical basis for any government policy because the foundation for 
representation and the source of revenues is the entire population. Welfare 
policy, as now administered, attempts to inject the cultural values of the 
majority upon recipients who are predominantly of a different socioeconomic 
background. This incongruity creates acrimony between the recipients and 
the benefactors. By eliminating incentives found in eligibility criteria, benefit' 
levels, and assumed resource sharing by different units {family,. individual, 
unmarried), a neutral policy.allows partieipa!rts maximum freedom of choice. 
Within the context of the welfare system, the number of choices may be 
limited .due to economic constraints, but equality; in opportunity to choose 
could be achieved. Implementation of such a policy requires that modifica-
tions be made in the neutrality premise in order to compensate for past 
discrimination due to race or sex-discrimination which may be a cause of a 
person's need for public assistance in the first place. However, any deviations 
from the neutrality goal must be assessed and continuously monitored to 
ensure that they are moving the programs in the direction of ultimately 
attaining the neutrality goal. Furthermore, as the integration of public and 
private sector services increases, the opportunity exists for moving toward 
entirely neutral governmental policies. The private sector could take the 
responsibility for programs that take into account and legitimately compen-
sate for ascriptive differences and their effects, which have resulted primarily 
from discriminatory practices that have been and will probably continue to 
be a reality in all societies. The key point is that by incorporating neutrality 
as a goal in the formulation of welfare policy, personal choices are not 
restricted and educational, economic, and social inequities can be eliminated. 
The result is a welfare system that in fact moves society closer to two of its 
basic ideals-equality and self-determination. 
This paper uses the neutrality premise as the basis for analyzing current 
and proposed welfare policy. The following three sections give an overview of 
general demographic characteristics of women, a discussion of the treatment 
of women in current major welfare programs, and a statistical profile of 
women in poverty. 
In the third section, President Carter's Program for Better Jobs and 
Income (PBJI) is examined for its positive and negative impacts on poor 
women. Carter's comprehensive proposal represents the second time in this 
decade that a uniform guaranteed income based upon a negative income tax 
{NIT) has been offered as an alternative to the current welfare "system." The 
NIT concept was first considered and developed within the Johnson 
Administration. In 1969, it was the central premise in President Nixon's 
Family Assistance Plan. In addition, PBJI breaks new ground by directly 
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linking a major public jobs component to the welfare system. At the time of 
this writing (summer 1978) it appears that Congress will not act on the Carter 
proposal. In its stead, "piecemeal" proposals are being considered as the 95th 
Congress' reform solution. However, the importance of the trend toward a 
guaranteed-income/guaranteed jobs welfare system should not be overlooked. 
Based on historical government operations, it is highly likely that these same 
concepts-general and specific-will be seen again in future reform efforts. 
Finally, recommendations are made for improving PBJI. 
SOCIAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II 
Labor Force Participation 
When the United States entered World War II, a "massive public relations 
campaign" informing women of all ages that it was "unpatriotic for them to 
stay at home" brought more women into the labor force during the four war 
years than had entered the labor force during the previous forty years.9 
Although the women who worked during the war were largely excluded from 
policymaking and management roles, they were, for the first and only time, 
accorded an opportunity to enter other traditionally "male" jobs. At the end 
of the war, 80 percent of the women workers expressed a desire to keep their 
jobs. 10 They didn't. It was not until 1965 that the percentage of women 
working equaled the World War II level. 
Today, women are el\tering the labor force at younger ages, the labor force 
participation rate of married women is increasing, more mothers are working, 
and more women are seeking full-time employment. In 1975, 64 percent of 
all women aged 20-24 years were in the labor force. 11 The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics estimates that by 1990 75 percent of women between these ages 
will be seeking employment. 1 2 Young married women with children are 
entering the labor market in even greater proportions. While the labor force 
participation rate of all women ages 20 to 24 rose from 45 percent in 1960 to 
61 percent in 1974, the rate for mothers with children under six in this age 
group doubled from 18 percent to 37 percent. Between 1948 and 1977, the 
labor force participation rates for women with all children under six more 
than quadrupled.1 3 
Yet, women's median earnings as compared to those of men continue to 
decline. In 1967 a woman working full-time year round earned sixty-four 
cents to a man's dollar; in 1973 she earned fixty-nine cents to his dollar; and 
in 1977 she earned fifty-six cents to his dollar. 14 The ratio of female 
unemployment to male unemployment has also worsened in recent decades. 
In addition, the "occupational distribution of jobs by sex has shown no 
improvement in the last twenty years," with a majority of women still 
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confined to low pay, low status, and upwardly immobile jobs.1 5 
It is therefore not surprising that women are poorer today than in years 
past. The incidence of female-headed families below the poverty level has 
increased from 23 percent in 195916 to 48 percent in 1976.17 Thirty-five 
percent of these women worked in 1976, but at jobs which paid them too 
little to escape poverty. Of the poor women working in 1976, 71.6 percent 
worked in clerical and sales jobs, 1 8 which in 1975 paid women only about 39 
percent of what males in the same occupations earned. 1 9 
General Laws Affecting Women 
Among the most remarkable changes in the American economy in the past 
quarter. century has been the dramatic increase . in the number and 
proportions of women who work for pay outside the home.20 At the same 
time, women's earnings relative to those of men have decreased; occupational 
segregation has shown no improvement; the unemployment rate of women 
has continued to worsen in relation to that of men; sex discrimination in 
employment is blatant; and the percentages of women below the poverty 
level continue to increase. 
In view of these trends and the fact that "30 percent of the sex differential 
in earnings appears to be unexplainable by factors of qualification, 
and .. therefore appears to be due to discrimination,"2 1 the powerful 
antidiscrimination laws in employment appear not to be working. The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), charged with administration 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, is responsible for eliminating employment 
discrimination based on sex. Although EEOC is recognized as applying the 
most progressive standards to issues of discrimination, its backlog of cases in 
the spring of 1976 was greater than I 00,000. 2 2 · 
Charged with seeing that employees performing equal work be paid equal 
wages, the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has been 
criticized for its lack of female representation in the Equal Pay Program. In 
July 1977, the Department of Labor guidelines for the Equal Pay Act still 
permitted part-time workers, the majority of whom are female, to be paid 
lower hourly wages than full-time workers. EPA regulations do not contain 
provisions concerning the use of maternity leave and do not prohibit the 
exclusion of employees of one sex from training programs. 
Another major tool of antidiscrimination is Executive Order 11246, as 
amended by Executive Order 11375, October 13, 1967, prohibiting sex 
discrimination in employment by the federal government and by federal 
contractors. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Program (OFCCP) of 
OOL, administrator of this program, has only recently proposed regulations 
setting goals for the hiring of women in the construction industry, a major 
7 
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recipient of government contracts. The Civil Rights Commission in its 1977 
evaluation of OFCCP noted the continuation of major deficiencies regarding 
sex discrimination in the OFCCP guidelines.2 3 
The Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act, effective October 28, 1975, 
made it illegal for a commercial creditor to discriminate on the basis of sex or 
marital status. In March 1977, coverage was extended to prohibit discrimina-
tion based on the receipt of public assistance. The law is strong, but the 
regulations written by the Federal Reserve Board have been criticized as 
weak.24 
Marriage and Childbirth 
Changing social values have affected women in other areas. Women now 
marry at later ages, and between one-third and one-half of all marriages end in 
divorce. Although birth rates for women ages fifteen to nineteen decreased 
substantially from 1950 to 1970, the illegitimacy rate for the women of these 
ages has increased from 12.6 to 22.4 per 1,000 women. 2 5 Premarital sexual 
activity is beginning at ever-younger ages, yet in one study 80 percent of 
sexually active teenagers reported using no birth control.2 6 It has been 
estimated that the majority of illegitimate births are to women at 
near-poverty and poverty levels. 2 7 
It is obvious that a serious need exists for increased access to family 
planning information and assistance. The need is made even more pressing by 
the re~nt Supreme Court and Congressional decisions limiting the use of 
Medicaid or other tax-generated funds for abortion. The impact of these 
decisions on poor women, as well as upon the welfare system, cannot be 
ignored. 
In summary, many women are caught in a double bind. "Society defines 
woman's place as in the home, caring for the children ... ,yet women who 
receive public assistance are held responsible when they fail to find jobs, fail 
to earn enough, and fail to provide proper child care for their children."28 
THE CURRENT WELFARE SYSTEM 
The present patchwork system of public assistance programs is the result 
of incremental legislation which reflects conflicting goals and questionable 
assumptions about who "deserves" public aid. Basic changes in society's 
composition and in attitudes toward the government's responsibility for 
assisting those in need have further rendered the current system out of date 
and in need of reform. It is therefore necessary to reexamine briefly the cur-
rent welfare "system" in light ofits inconsistencies with the current situation. 
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Historically, there have been five major goals in the federal welfare system: 
adequate benefit levels for those deemed "deserving"; maintenance of work 
incentives; equitable assistance for those persons in similar circumstances; 
administrative efficiency ; and fiscal restraint. 2 9 Some of these goals are 
inherently in conflict: adequacy versus incentive, fiscal restraint versus 
adequacy, incentive versus efficiency, and adequacy versus equity. 
In attempting to meet all of these goals, albeit in differing degrees, 
categorical programs have been constructed in terms of two concepts which 
affect women. The first is a definition of "deserving," used to distinguish 
those persons who are expected to work from those who are not. 3 0 Women 
with children under six years of age are not expected to work, nor is a woman 
with a husband who does work, regardless of his income. Thus, women are 
defined as wives or mothers rather than as individuals. The second distinction 
is between employable and unemployable.31 This concept is usually applied 
to the man in the family as it assumes he will be the source of family income. 
It is only when the woman is the single head of the family that her 
"employability" is considered, and again the basis for determining whether 
she "should" work is the age of her child. Thus, not only are poor single 
women with no children and women with children above a certain age 
excluded from public aid, but also excluded are childless husband-wife 
families who, regardless of work effort, live below the poverty level. 
There are numerous systematic problems with the current programs. The 
primary problems, described in other works,32 Include gaps in coverage, 
inequities, work disincentives, family splitting incentives, overlapping bene-
fits, and administrative chaos. These deficiencies and their impact on poor 
women can be seen in an analysis of four programs: AFDC/WIN, CETA, 
Child Care, and the Food Stamps program. 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children was originally designed to 
provide assistance to children in families headed by unmarried mothers. 3 3 
Various changes since 1936 have expanded AFDC to its present eligible 
population of families with single parents of either sex, families in which the 
children are living with relatives because no parent is present, families with a 
father incapacitated due to illness, and in twenty-four states, families with 
two parents present but in which the father is unemployed (AFDC-UF).34 As 
of September 1977, there were 3.5 million families receiving AFDC, 78 
percent of which were headed by single females. 3 5 
Two general assumptions underlie the basic AFDC program in operation in 
twenty-six states. The first is that if the father is present he should be able to 
earn an income adequate for support of the family. This assumption results in 
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strict eligibility criteria which create an incentive for the father to leave his 
family in order that the mother and children can receive public assistance. He 
is thereby discouraged from attempting to provide monetary assistance and 
from performing familial duties as a father. A second assumption is that 
assistance is due only to those not expected to work, i.e., women with 
children under six, resulting in a disincentive for these mothers to work, 
regardless of their ability or desire to do so. These assumptions, based on the 
concepts of "deserving" and "man as breadwinner," continue to ·undermine 
the achievement of equity and self-sufficiency by those persons who need it 
most. 
The AFDC-UF program alleviates the incentive for fathers to leave the 
family but fails to recognize women as wage earners. This is seen in the states' 
provisions that a two-parent family is eligible only if the father is 
unemployed.36 The "employable-unemployable" definition does not apply 
to women because they are considered only as mothers and wives. The 
two-parent family is also forced to choose between benefits receivable under 
Unemployment Insurance of AFOC-UF, while a single parent (male or 
female) family is eligible for AFDC even if the parent is receiving 
Un employment Insurance. 3 7 
State discretion in · determining eligibility criteria, benefit levels, and 
services to be provided further complicate the administration of AFDC/ 
AFDC-VF. The effect has been a wide variation of inequitable standards and 
services, highly restrictive eligibility criteria, and subsistent benefits which are 
usually limited to a specified goal, regardless of the family's needs. As the 
number of applicants has increased, most states have opted for flat grants of a 
specific amount for a given family size in lieu of special grants which more 
closely fit each family's needs. The process of applying for assistance under 
AFOC is complex and humiliating, as determination of need is often based on 
intimate details about the applicant's private life.38 The wide variation 
among the states.makes it extremely difficult to monitor for compliance with 
the federal regulations. 
As a condition for eligibility for AFDC, all applicants over sixteen years of 
age are required to register for the Work Incentive Program (WIN) unless 
legally exempt for reasons of health, incapacity, or responsibility for a child 
under six years of age .39 the general assumption in the program is that a 
woman is "deserving" of public assistance only if she has young children; 
otherwise, she must work. WIN emphasizes immediate job placement, 
providing training and public service jobs only as a last resort. This emphasis 
on immediate job placement severely limits a woman's career potential, which 
might be improved by the acquisition of salable skills. As a result, most 
female WIN participants who are placed in jobs tend to end up with the 
lowest paid and most demeaning work which offers little chance for 
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significant salary increases.4 0 Between January and June 1977, the average 
hourly wage of male WIN participants was $3.69, while female WIN 
participants averaged $2.72.41 Finally, "if day care is available, a mother 
must accept it whether it provides for her children or not.. .. " 4 2 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) 
The purpose of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 
is to provide training, employment, and other services to the unemployed, the 
economically disadvantaged, and the underemployed. In February 1975, 
approximately one-third of the participants in CET A were women.4 3 
Due to the segr~gated job market, discrimination, the traditional role of 
women as homemakers, and the resu1ting lack of work experience and salable 
job skills, the CETA program must be analyzed in the context of how well it 
meets the special needs of eligible women. The decentralized administrative 
structure of CETA allows great discretion to the prime sponsor in assigning 
participants to different types of training slots, usually resulting in the 
placement of women in training programs for stereotypically "female" 
occupations, such as health and sales. The program also fails to serve older 
women living with their husbands in families below the poverty level. If these 
women live in states with AFDC-UF they are also excluded from WIN, the 
effect being that they are eligible for neither WIN nor CETA.44 In the 
remaining AFDC states the tendency has been for CET A and WIN 
administrators to "compete" for the younger clientele while ignoring older 
needy women. Furthermore, in most CETA programs, women are not 
encouraged to participate if their husbands are present. "It may be that local 
CETA systems will not tum away these women, but...they are not sought 
after as high target groups."45 
Child Care 
Child care programs best exemplify the patchwork nature of the welfare 
system. In 1972, there were at least nine different federal agencies legally 
authorized to provide funding for child ·care projects under at least eight 
programs.46 In addition, states may opt to use Title XX funds to provide 
child care on a matching 75 percent to 25 percent federal-state basis. In 1976, 
25.2 percent of the total Title XX monies were utilized for this purpose.4 7 
Funds under AFDC/WIN are allotted to states for child welfare services, 
including child care. Of the total $226 million allocated under AFDC/WIN in 
fiscal year 1977, an estimated $4.7 million was used for child care to 19,000 
children. In general, the estimated total federal expenditures for child care in 
1977, including tax credits, was $2.5 billion.48 Even with this large amount 
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of money, the lack of child care facilities continues to restrict poor mothers 
from attaining self-sufficiency. "While l out of 3 mothers of preschool 
children works, licensed centers nationally have only 900,000 spaces for these 
6 million children."49 
Food Stamps 
Eligibility for food stamp coupons is based upon the size and monthly net 
income of a household unit.so These in-kind benefits are uniform across the 
nation and since 1974 have been provided through all counties in the United 
States.s 1 Women constitute 66 percent of all food stamp recipients between 
the ages of 18 and 34. Twenty-seven percent of food stamp recipients were 
over 66 years of age; sixty-seven percent of these people are women.s 2 
Use of the household unit size in determining eligibility allegedly provides 
an inceritive for low-income families to live together, theoretically allowing 
them to take advantage of economies of scale resulting from the pooling of 
resources. In contrast to the definition of a family unit, the household unit 
definition allows for a wider variety of living arrangements for recipients and 
thereby .broader coverage of those in need.s 3 The Food Stamp Program also 
avoids the work disincentive found in other public assistance programs by 
reducing benefits only slightly as incoine increases.s 4 However, the generous 
benefits and "liberal" work incentives have the effect of increasing the 
eligible population by including persons who have relatively high incomes. 
Also, if counted with the other welfare cash benefits and in-kind services such 
as Medicaid, the overall effect of the program may be to decrease the work 
incentive such that people choose to continue to receive the combined 
in-kind and cash benefits rather than work.ss This impact is diminished to 
some degree by the stigma of welfare and the limited choice as to how the 
coupons can be spent. Overall, the Food Stamp Program exemplifies the high 
cost of a fairly neutral policy which serves a broad needy population with 
moderately high benefits. 
THE PRESENT SITUATION 
Statistical Profile of Women in Poverty 
In 1976, 12.2 percent of all women over sixteen years of age lived in 
poverty. The comparable figure for men was 7.7 percent. In actual numbers, 
10,034,000 women over sixteen lived in poverty, while 5,736,000 men over 
sixteen lived below the poverty level. In the same year, 48 percent of all 
families below the poverty level were headed by females. Of all unrelated 
persons below the poverty line, 66.5 percent were women. Although the 
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number of families with male heads living in poverty decreased by 8 percent 
between 1975 and 1976, the number of poor families with female heads 
increased from 2.4 to 2.5 million during the same period, an increase similar 
to that observed the year before . 
·Examination of families with female heads below the poverty level in 1976 
reveals several interesting facts. Of the total, 74.l percent were of prime 
childbearing age (fourteen to forty-four) and 74.7 percent lived in families of 
two to four members. Over 50 percent had one or two children, with only 7 .9 
percent having no children under eighteen years. Surprisingly, 8.6 percent of 
the female heads living in poverty had attended college, although the number 
of years attended is not ascertainable. Of the 60.9 percent who attended high 
school, 29.2 percent had graduated. About one-fifth of the female heads had 
less than an eighth grade education·. By race, poor female heads of Spanish 
origin had distinctively lower levels of educational attainment. Of this group, 
64 percent had an eighth grade education or less. Only 11.3 percent had 
finished high school and 2.7 percent had attended some college. 
Of all female-headed poverty level households, 65.9 percent were not in 
the labor force. Approximately the same percentages of whites and blacks 
were in the labor force , but black female heads were more likely to be 
unemployed. Most of the poor women who worked did so part-time. Of those 
who worked, 71.6 percent worked in clerical , sales, and service occupations, 
including private household service. 5 6 
Reassessment of Goals 
The main tenet of this paper-that every person should be afforded an 
equal opportunity to develop his/her full potential and to seek self-suffici-
ency- naturally embodies the principle of neutral treatment as regards sex 
and/or marital status. We offer the following definitions as a basis for our 
analysis: 
Neutrality-a policy which does not influence a person's choice con-
cerning such fundamentals as marriage, childbirth, or familial respon-
sibility, regardless of sex. 
Equity - benefits are fair and uniform, so that people in the same 
circumstances are treated in the same manner. 
Adequacy- benefits plus private income are sufficient to sustain life 
and provide basic amenities. 
Incentives-benefits are not substitutes for savings, private income, 
or family obligations. 
Efficiency-programs are administered at the least cost commen-
surate with program integrity. 
Cost-resources are used effectively to ensure the lowest possible 
cost in the process of achieving the goals. 
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PROGRAM FOR BEITER JOBS AND INCOME 
Major Provisions 
The Carter Administration's Program for Better Jobs and Income is a 
comprehensive plan aimed at alleviating many of the problems caused by the 
uncoordinated and categorical nature of the current welfare system.5 7 PBJI is 
primarily focused on relating work to welfare by guaranteeing jobs or income 
floors at 65 percent of the poverty level. The proposal also extends unifonn 
federal cash assistance grants to all peISOns below the poverty level, including 
single individuals, two-parent and extended families, and childless couples. 
The Carter proposal simplifies management of the system by increasing the 
federal government's role in the administration of uniform rules which 
replace the complex categorical requirements of the current system. The 
primary financing of PBJI is shifted to the federal government in order to 
provide fiscal relief to state and local governments. Finally, the Carter plan is 
aimed at promoting family stability. 
Positive Impact on Women 
Many of the provisions in the Program for Better Jobs and Income will 
. alleviate the discrepancies in the current systeI.D which negatively affect 
· women. First, universal benefits available to all low income persons regardless 
of their family structure will extend coverage to women who are currently 
ineligible-single, divorced, and widowed women without children, low 
income married women, and women living in extended families. Also, if states 
supplement the basic benefit, the replacement of AFDC in-kind seivices and 
Food Stamps with cash grants would provide recipients with greater control 
over how their . money is spent. This can be particularly important for 
mothers who can utilize these grants for their children's other needs. 
Secondly, the benefits for single-female-headed families will be higher in 
fourteen states which currently offer low benefits. Third, the high priority of 
jobs and training as an integral part of the welfare system recognizes that 
people living below the poverty line often do not have salable skills necessaiy 
to find work and that only through jobs placement and adequate training can 
a person achieve independence from the welfare system. The social and 
educational biases against women developing such skills and/or working in the 
labor force make this an extremely important provision for women who need 
to work. The allocation of approximately 300,000 part-time positions and 
the provision for flexitime in the jobs component will allow women who are 
responsible for care of their children to develop skills and earn income for 
their families. Finally, the uniformity and federalization of the welfare 
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system may decrease state discretion in setting eligibility requirements and 
selecting program participants, which has frequently resulted in subtle and 
not-so-subtle sex discrimination. 
Negative Impact on Women 
Although the Carter Plan appears neutral, several provisions merit scrutiny 
for their potentially negative impact upon women. One such provision is the 
Public Service Employment (PSE) eligibility definition of the "principal 
earner." The principal earner is defined as that person in a family with 
children who had the higher earnings or worked more hours in the six months 
prior to application for assistance. Thus, each single-parent family is eligible 
for a PSE job or training slot if the principal earner is unable to secure 
employment in the private or regular public sector. However,. the provision as 
applied to two-parent families negates the goal of allowing persons of both 
sexes to achieve their "full potential as workers and human beings."5 8 
The principal earner in a two-parent family can be either parent if (a) 
neither has worked in the last six months, or (b) both have worked but one 
has made more money or has worked more hours during the last six months. 
If the parent who worked the .most hours also made the most money, that 
parent will be deemed the principal earner. Lastly, if the principal earner is 
incapacitated or otherwise unavailable for work, the secondary earner is 
allowed to take the position. 
The Department of Labor (DOL) contends that this provision is the fairest 
and simplest way to assure income maintenance to those most in need.5 9 
However, DOL's assertion that the rule is not sexist (per se) contradicts the 
fact that estimates derived from a DOL simulation model show that in only 
13.6 percent of two-parent families will women be the PSE participant.6 0 
If the long-term goal of welfare reform is to assist families in achieving 
independence and self-sufficiency, it is self-defeating to impose arbitrary 
criteria as to how the family can utilize the jobs provision. Even if fiscal 
limitations require allocating only one PSE position per family, the rationale 
for further government specification of whom that PSE participant will be 
cannot be reconciled with this goal. The neutral policy goal of freedom of 
choice is violated without any real benefit to the family or any real savings to 
the government. Once a family's need for a PSE job or training slot is 
established, a neutral policy would allow the family to decide which parent 
would participate. 
The principal earner concept also perpetuates the continued dependency 
of women on other sources for support. If DOL estimates are correct in 
stating that 13.6 percent of the principal earners are women, the remaining 
86.4 percent of these women in two-parent families may be forced to forego 
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completely the opportunity to acquire work experience and salable skills. 
Given the high divorce and desertion rates, it is likely that these women will 
someday have to support themselves and their children. Elimination of the 
principal earner designation would greatly improve women's oportunities to 
gain work skills and experience if they choose to do so. 61 
The principal earner provision also raises practical and philosophical 
questions regarding adequacy and costs. An example is its effect on 
two-parent families in which the person designated as principal earner has 
earned more money and worked more hours during the preceding six months. 
The policy, in effect, requires the person who has the best chance of finding 
employment in the regular job market to accept a PSE slot after only a 
five-week search. This results in a cost to the family based on the lost 
opportunity for the secondary earner to use the PSE position to support the 
family while allowing the "principal earner" ample time to seek employment 
in a higher paying private or regular public sector job. In addition, evaluations 
of the WIN program indicate that it is the person with the least work 
experience who benefits most from public sector employment programs.62 In 
terms of adequacy and independence, this policy may severely restrict a 
family from the im=:.t:diate and long-term benefits of a tw~arner family. 
The principal earner debate ultimately raises the philosophical considera-
tion of how income support funds should be allocated. The principal earner 
provision embodies the concept that equity has priority over adequacy. The 
argument based on allowing each family maximum access to work opportu-
nities in PBJI is necessarily less equitable. However, if the major goal of PBTI 
is to assist disadvantaged families in developing self-sufficiency, adequate 
opportunity for jobs and training must take precedence over equity. In terms 
of administration and cost, this emphasis is more feasible than it appears. 
Under PBn, the government's ability to supply enough PSE jobs to meet the 
demand is improbable. Therfore, some people will have to wait before 
entering the jobs program. By establishing voluntary or first-come-first-served 
priorities, and at the same time allowing both adults in eligible families to 
participate in PSE if necessary, the family's ability to earn an income above 
the poverty line will increase at a faster rate. Once this is accomplished, room 
can be made for serving the next person in line. In terms of equity, those 
having to wait will receive adequate benefits, and in the long run, equity is 
maintained, since all families may have to experience some delays. Moreover, 
the dual guaranteed-income/guaranteed-job approach of PBJI to income 
maintenance should prevent total destitution for any family. 
The primary argument against the above suggestion is cost. However, costs 
must be assessed in terms of the short- and long-run monetary and social 
benefits. In the . short run, costs may increase due to the additional cash 
assistance necessary for those families who have to wait longer to begin PSE 
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than they would have under the current proposal. If this temporary waiting 
period is too long, the social cost could be high , as participants would 
probably become discouraged and general disenchantment with the plan 
would hurt its potential success. Therefore , short-run costs will primarily 
depend on the success of the jobs component in training and placing 
participants in jobs leading to economic self-sufficiency. Long-run costs also 
depend on the efficiency and effectiveness of PSE. If reasonably successful, 
more families will permanently leave the welfare rolls, thereby allowing more 
persons to participate. Even if this plan costs more in monetary terms (up to 
some limit), the potential social gains from a welfare system providing 
opportunities rather than subsidies for those in need would far exceed the 
monetary costs. In additfori.~ With families achievmg Independence at a faster 
rate, children in these families will have a better environment in which to 
mature. 
In summary, the decision to eliminate the principal earner provision is one 
in which adequacy and independence must be weighed against feasible costs. · 
In a society which holds the ideals of equal opportunity and self-determina-
tion, the judgment should not be a difficult one. However, it will ultimately 
depend on the government's ability to demonstrate that the social and 
long-run economic benefits defived from a successful welfare system are 
greater than the monetary costs of providing it. 
As previously mentioned, the number of jobs provided in PBJI may fall 
short of meeting the total need of the eligible population. Assuming that a 
system of priorities is needed to allocate PSE slots, the criteria for assigning 
priorities and the discretion given to the prime sponsors administering the 
jobs component will greatly affect women's participation and potential for 
achieving independence. 
The "expected-to-work" classifications, if used to rank eligibility for the 
jobs program, will reduce the opportunities for those who are not expected to 
work, i.e., single parents with children under six. Similarly, the part-time 
work requirement for single parents with school-aged children places these 
parents, mostly women, on a lower level of priority, as their participation in 
full-time positions may be seen as voluntary instead of necessary. Accord-
ingly, prime sponsors may view their placement in the full-time positions as 
discretionary. As the number of part-time jobs is inadequate , some women 
with school-aged children will be without jobs altogether, despite social 
expectations and their own aspirations. 
If priority is based on the prime sponsor's perception of short-run 
cost-effective placement, it is likely that many single parents will rank low on 
the list of applicants because of their need for support services such as child 
care. The older woman without children who is expected to work may also 
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suffer from the discretion of a prime sponsor who views her placement or 
training as difficult and inefficient. Thus, based on the undesirable effects of 
these options and on the histroical problem of discrimination in the current 
CETA program, it is imperative that strict federal regulations regarding the 
placement of participants in jobs and training be devised and enforced. 
The basic dilemma in the previous discussion of the jobs component is that 
of work requirements versus work incentives. Given that the work ethic is a 
fundamental premise of this society, the welfare system must incorporate 
work as a condition for both receiving and setting the level of benefits.63 
However, the use of work requirements in current welfare programs has been 
largely unsuccessful, primarly due to the lack of available decent jobs and 
poor enforcement that allows persons wishing to avoid work to easily do so. 
Under PBJI, the work requirements and the corresponding placement on 
the upper (income support) and lower (earned income supplement) tfo1s 
continue to create family instability and work disincentives, although to a 
lesser degree than in the present system. For example, a two-parent family of 
four is placed on the lower tier and receives $2,300. (See Figure I.) If the 
principal earner leaves the family, it automatically moves to the upper tier 
and receives $3,600 in benefits if the remaining parent is not required to 
work or cannot find work. The person who leaves receives $1,100 as a 
childlt:ss individual if no job is available. In this case, the family can receive 
higher total benefits by breaking up and if no jobs are available. 
The work requirement also relegates the job of childrearing to a secondary 
status by requiring women, who constitute the majority of childrearers, to 
take work regardless of the desires or needs of the family. Single-parent 
families, · 95 percent of which are female-headed, are arbitrarily assigned to 
the lower income tier if the parent chooses to stay at home to care for a child 
over six years of age. This requirement fails to account for the parent's role as 
childrearer and the restrictions this role places on the amount of time he or 
she can work. This is the essence of a non-neutral policy and illustrates the 
dilemma in developing new policy that does not affect individuals' choices 
but is constrained by a work ethic which in the past has failed to accord 
economic value to the "job" of rearing children. A neutral policy would in 
fact give credence to this function by extending the choice of work in the 
economic market or work in the home to the person of either sex who is 
responsible for rearing the children. Thus, while welfare policy must not 
define women as childrearers, it must not ignore the importance of this 
function to society. 
A final problem with the work requirement is that it is aimed at the 
minority of people eligible for welfare. The results of income support 
experiments have shown that it is the lack of jobs rather than the Jack of 
desire which places people in poverty. For women, child care responsibilities 
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Benefits 
$4,200 
FIGURE 1 
BASIC ANNUAL BENEFIT SCHEDULES FOR 1978 
FOR FOUR-PERSON FILING UNITS* 
Income Support Tier 
(Upper)a 
$2,300 Earned Income Supplement 
Tier (Lower)b 
Labor Income 
$3,800 $8,400 
*From Work, Welfare, and the Program for Better Jobs and Income, A study 
for the Joint Economic Committee, p . 15. 
Benefits vary according to the type of filing unit on each tier. 
a) Includes those persons not "expected" to work; 
Single-parent families with children under six years old 
· Aged, blind, disabled 
b) Includes those persons "expected" to work; 
Two-parent families 
Single-parent families with child six years or over 
Childless couples 
Single individuals 
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and the lack of skills add to this problem. Therefore, the work requirement is 
an inefficient and non-neutral attempt to embody the work ethic in PBJI. 
As an alternative which eliminates the work requirement and emphasizes 
work incentives through tax credits and benefit levels, the neutral policy 
would allow maximum freedom of choice; work provisions would be 
associated with opportunity instead of coercion; more efficient allocation of 
administrative resources would be made possible by shifting emphasis from 
enforcement to training and placement of those desiring to work (the 
majority of the poverty population); and job placement would thereby be 
more successful, improving the opportunity for self-sufficiency. Although 
there will remain a segment of persons who subsist on welfare assistance 
because they do not want to work, the low benefits will discourage abuse of 
the voluntary-incentive system, abuse which is already possible under the 
current PBJI. More importantly, the costs of abuse would be minimal 
compared to the potential societal benefits of a positive and more humanistic 
welfare system. 
Whether or not the PBJI work requirement remains intact, and political 
feasibility virtually guarantees that it will, the need remains for explicit 
affirmative action guidelines. The discretion enjoyed by the CETA prime 
sponsors regarding jobs, training, and placement in PBJI is substantial. 
Considering the potentially inadequate supply of PSE positions for eligibles, 
the traditionally "male" nature of 80 percent of the targeted occupations,64 
and the historical inertia of CETA prime sponsors regarding employment of 
women, BPJI fails to deal directly with the problem of what may be termed 
"discretionary discrimination." The bill lacks provisions stressing affirmative 
action and nontraditional training and placement of women to help break the 
cycle of occupational segregation which keeps women's wages below those of 
men and which retards the female participants' opportunities for upward 
mobility. DOL asserts that employment discrimination is being battled by a 
variety of agencies backed by antidiscriminatory laws. As previously noted, 
these agencies are already overburdened. It is therefore important to include 
measures for eradication of these problems at the very outset of a job 
creation program rather than to burden further the already overworked 
enforcement agencies. Without such specific and strong provisions in the laws 
and regulations of PBJI, the subtle discrimination that so frequently goes 
unrecognized will continue. 
The Department of Labor's allocation of 150,000 part-time child care job 
positions exclusively for single parents65 typifies the occupational segrega-
tion to which women have been subjected for centuries. The Department's 
response is logical, but unimaginative. The positions are necessarily part-time; 
part-time jobs are needed by single parents of school-aged children; these 
people obviously know something about child care-so the slots are reserved 
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for single parents with children between the ages of six and fourteen. 
However, 95 percent of single parents with school-aged children are women, 
and these women will be channeled in to low-pay, low-status, low-skill, and 
upwardly immobile jobs simply by virtue of their status as mothers of 
school-aged children. 
Not knowing what percentage of all child care slots will be part-time, it is 
difficult to suggest a workable scheme for filling the jobs without exclusive 
reliance upon women. A possibility is job sharing between a principal and a 
secondary worker in two-parent families, whereby a 40-hour work week 
could be split between the two parents with both possibly working joint 
hours . This scheme would not only eliminate or reduce sex stereotyping, but 
would also enable two family members to gain some work experience from 
one PSE slot, multiplying the effectiveness of this component. At any rate, 
the de facto sex designation inclusion embodied in this decision must be 
eliminated. There is no reason to think that the children or the single parents 
benefit from the scheme. Nor is ther reason to believe that many of the other 
types of jobs foreseen by DOL are incompatible with part-time hours. 
Related to the need for part-time jobs is the provision for adequate child 
care for mothers who work outside the home. Due to societal standards 
which designate women as the primary childrearers, the issue of adequate 
child care in PBJI is directly related to the opportunities for mothers to work, 
either by requirement or on a voluntary basis. Thus, day care will directly 
affect the income of a poor family vis-a-vis earned income and cash benefit 
levels. The availability and cost of child care will influence poor women's 
choices of gaining the work income, skills, and experience which can increase 
their long-run economic independence-an important factor in light of the 
growing number of female-headed families and the rising divorce and 
abandonment rates. The Department of Labor estimates that one million 
mothers will be required to work under PBJI and another 500,000 are 
expected to volunteer. 6 6 These figures translate into approximately three 
million children for whom some kind of child care will be needed. 
As explained above, a two-parent family is automatically assigned to the 
lower earned-income tier, and at least one parent is expected to work. All 
one-parent families (assumed for purposes of this discussion to be female-
headed due to the fact that less than 5 percent of all single-parent families are 
male-headed) are placed on the upper-income support tier, with mothers of 
children six years of age or younger not required to work, although they may 
choose to do so. Mothers of children seven to fourteen years old are required 
to work part-time, with exemptions allowed only if the child needs "special 
supervision or care" (as amended in the House Subcommittee on Welfare 
Refonn). Women with children over fourteen are assigned to the lower tier, as 
are women who refuse work while on the upper tier. All of these women who 
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work are allowed to deduct $150 per child per month (limit of $300 per 
month) from their earned income before calculation of income support 
payments. The mother retains descretion as to the type of child care. The 
result of this credit is that the break-even point for benefits is raised from 
$9,400 to $13,000 for female-headed families on either tier. In effect, this 
expands the eligible population of female-headed families to those with 
incomes below $13,000, if work-related child care is utilized.67 The jobs 
component of PBJI also provides $1 billion for an estimated one million child 
care slots in formal child care arrangements. The House subcommittee further 
specified that a small percentage of CETA job funds be used for child care 
and referrals; however, the actual amount is unknown at this time.68 
Besides the question of women's choice to stay at home to care for their 
children, the child care provisions in PBJI raise several important issues 
regarding women. The primary issue is whether to allocate child care monies 
to federal facilities or directly to the family. Advocates of the former argue 
that low income families will be more likely to use their limited resources on 
necessities other than child care. In addition, a study by the American Public 
Welfare Association under contract with HEW found that organized and 
supervised care is consistently better than informally arranged care . 6 9 An 
alternative proposal, a federal child development program, could provide 
uniformly high standards which assure mothers at work that their children are 
properly cared for, and, along the lines of Head Start, could begin the 
educational process which would facilitate the children's breaking out of the 
poverty cycle. Such a program is hindered by three problems: unknown 
demand, high costs, and the charge of "socialistic" child care. 
Corresponding to the unknown demand problem is the issue of whether 
the number of child care facilities is sufficient to provide working 
opportunities to all parents who want or are required to work. Allowing the 
parents to choose through the wage disregard also provides flexibility to meet 
their diversified needs. In support of the PBJI child care provisions, the 
Administration cites studies showing that poor women prefer informal, 
usually family-related care for their children. Conversely, opponents argue 
that the "preference" indicated in studies is invalid because federal child care 
options are limited and result in no choice other than family-related care for 
most of those in need. Currently there are long waiting lists for federal child 
care slots, a fact that seems to indicate that when provided, federal child care 
is desired. Short of a child development program, opponents to the PBJI 
provisions support the funneling of federal monies into expanding Title XX 
child care facilities open to all families on a sliding-fee/income-test basis. 7 0 
Another issue, related to those above and of extreme importance, is the 
adequacy of the tax deduction in PBJI. The Administration derived its 
proposed figures by averaging the itemized costs of child care for current . 
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AFDC recipients. However, the Child Welfare League estimated that the 
average expenses of care for one child are : "minimum-$185/month; 
"acceptable"-$276/month; and "desirable"-$344/month.71 Given these 
estimates, as well as regional cost variations, the PBJI amounts appear to be 
inadequate and arbitrary. Moreover, if the family chooses informal care the 
expenses will be high. For example, at $2 an hour, 8 hours a day, 5 days a 
week, the cost would be $320 per month for full child care of unknown 
standards. If child care costs are higher than the allowable deduction, a 
disincentive to work may occur. For example, cash assistance may provide 
more income to unemployed parents than earned income minus child care 
and other work-related expenses. 11lis is especially true for families with more 
than two children in need of child care costing more than the $300 limit. 
Resoluation of these issues requires a trade-off between high costs in the 
short run and self-sufficiency of the poor families, parents and children, in 
the long run. The goals of individual self-sufficiency through employment 
opportunities might be attainable if a comprehensive child development 
program is available to all families on a sliding-fees/income-test basis. Failing 
this, the child care provisions in PBJI must be adjusted to reflect actual child 
care expenses, more federal centers must be provided, and quality standards 
must be instituted and maintained for all child care facilities. 
The treatment of child support payments under PBJI presents another 
problem of sex-linked distinctions in determining income. Child support 
payments are considered unearned income and therefore reduce the monthly 
grant by 80 percent of the support payments received. However, if the 
absentee parent were present in the home, his or her in-kind support services 
would be totally excluded from income-earned or unearned. This contra-
diction impressively demonstrates the different values put upon parental 
responsibility by sex. The services of an at-home parent in a two-parent 
family, usually the female, are considered valueless and are not taxed, 
whereas support payments made by an absentee parent are placed in the same 
category and taxed at the same rate as royalties, dividends, and rents. While 
favoring intact families with an at-home parent, this policy continues to 
undermine the principle that both parents share a responsibility for their 
offspring. ' 
On the most basic level, the child support provision raises questions of 
incentives, equity, and adequacy. Assuming that both parents should 
contribute toward the support of their children, the provision offers slight 
incentive for the absentee parent to pay child support if he/she knows that 80 
percent of the payments will not directly benefit the child. Likewise, the 
non-absent parent has little incentive to pursue child support agreements or 
payments. This parent's gain will only be 20 percent of the amount paid, 
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possibly an insignificant amount when weighed against the time and trouble 
of pursuit. 
The importance of providing income maintenance for children is an 
integral part of the proposal , exemplified by the fact that families with 
children receive some minimum level of cash assistance even if the 
"expected-to-work" adult refuses a job. The importance of this goal to the 
proposal highlights the inequity of the child support provision that in effect 
punishes the child living in a broken home by taxing that child's support 
payment at 80 percent, but applying an "earned income" tax rate of only SO 
percent on the income were it provided by a non-absent working parent. For 
once, the issues of equity , incentive , and adequacy pose no conflicts. Taxing 
child support payments at the SO percent rate of earned income would 
increase the amount received by the child, would increase the incentives for 
pursuit, payment, and collection of child support agreements, and would help 
reduce the differential effects felt by a child of a broken home as opposed to 
a child of an in tact family . 
A final area of major impact on women is the PBJI provision for state 
supplementation.72 The uniform income support benefits , or cash assistance, 
provided under PBJI will greatly reduce the glaring inequities caused by 
widely differing state supplements in the present system . Due to this variance 
between states , the PBJI basic income guarantee will fall below the existing 
support levels in approximately thirty "high" benefit states. A state is 
determined to have "high" benefits if the combined AFDC and Food Stamp 
payment is greater than the $4,200 base support provided in PBJI. Therefore, 
it is necessary that states continue to supplement the new federal benefits in 
order to avoid decreases in assistance to those persons currently on welfare . 
The extent of a decrease will depend on the tier a family is assigned to as well 
as the existing benefits a particular state is now providing that family . 
Generally , the majority of two-parent families will experience increased 
income assistance regardless of state supplementation, since these families are 
ineligible for any assistance in the present system. The exceptions are 
two-parent families receiving AFDC/UF/Food Stamps in high-benefit states. 
The effect on single-headed families, again primarily involving women, is 
less positive. If states do not supplement federal payments, such families 
living in the approximately fourteen "low" - benefit states will receive higher 
benefits, while those families in the remaining thirty-six states will receive 
smaller income support payments. (The difference between the previously 
mentioned thirty high-benefit states and the fourteen/thirty-six estimate is 
due to anticipated increases in supplementation by six states prior to the 
implemen ta ti on of PBJI.) The decrease for those living in high-benefit states 
results from a stricter tax rate on earnings (SO%) and less generous treatment 
of work-related expenses under PBJI. Thus, the states' choice to supplement, 
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and the level of supplementation, will disproportionately affect the female-
headed families in poverty. 
Whether or not a state decides to supplement will depend on several 
intricately related factors. The Maintenance of Effort (MOE) provision in 
PBil requires that all states continue to supplement benefits at 90 percent of 
their current expenditures during the initial year of PBJI. Thereafter, the 
MOE requirement decreases by 30 percent each year, and is eliminated after 
the third year. The 90 percent requirement virtually guarantees maintenance 
of benefit levels in all states during the first year of PBJI implementation. 
However, as the MOE requirement expires, the incentive for states to 
continue supplementation will decrease because federal fiscal relief will be 
greater if state assistance is lower. The disincentive is reinforced by the fact 
that the money saved may be used for other state activities besides 
supplementation. At the same time, PBil's Hold Harmless clause guarantees 
matching federal payments for state supplements only as long as the total 
assistance per recipient is not greater than some preexisting level. The end 
result of this relief policy is that states are less likely to supplement after the 
first year. Furthermore, PBJI stipulates that cash assistance supplements must 
be matched by wage supplements up to 10 percent of the minimum wage in 
order to maintain work incentives. This added cost of supplementing will 
directly affect the states' choices. Combining these programmatic features 
with the general economic and political situations in each state, it would 
appear that continued supplementation is probable for a few high benefit 
states only . Thus, the current inequitable benefit differentials between states 
may continue to be a problem in PBJI. More importantly , in the thirty-six 
states where recipients will lose benefits if the state does not supplement, 
female-headed families will find themselves in a worse situation than under 
the present AFOC/Food Stamp programs. 
RECOMMEND A TIO NS 
Recommended Changes in PBJI 
While we applaud the efforts of the Administration in initiating simplifica-
tion of present programs, universal coverage for all low-income persons, and 
an integrated jobs program, we propose several changes that would lessen the 
inequitable effects upon women in poverty. 
First, the "principal earner" provision should be eliminated, allowing the 
low-income parents to decide which person will apply for the public service 
employment slot. 
Secondly, we feel that the work incentive of the program coupled with the 
desire by low-income people to work eliminates the need for the work 
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requirement, a non-neutral requirement hardly susceptible to enforcement. 
The need for explicit affirmative action guidelines and the elimination of 
all sex discrimination is of paramount importance in assuring the integrity of 
the jobs program. We recommend that the national administrators of the jobs 
program be required to furnish each job applicant a simple, concisely written 
summary of his/her legal rights, remedies, and duties, in a provision similar to 
that provided by the subcommittee for the cash assistance program. 
We recommend that mothers be afforded an equal right to pursue job and 
training opportunities by the provision of comprehensive, nonsexist child 
development programs. These programs should be monitored for compliance 
of national guidelines, and the $300 limit on deductions for child care 
expenses should be revised to correctly reflect the actual costs of quality 
child care. 
We also recommend that the Administration more vigorously and 
imaginatively examine the potential for increasing part-time and flexitime 
jobs for the jobs component of PBJI. The effect of an increase in these types 
of jobs would be to allow individuals and families greater flexibility in their 
off-work hours, making continuing education and the sharing of familial 
responsibilities easier. To the extent possible the Administration should 
encourage the creation of part-time and flexitime jobs in the private sector to 
facilitate the transition from public to private sector employment. 
To ~ncourage familial responsibility, we suggest that the incentive to pay 
and to collect child support payments be at least equal to the work incentive, 
by the consideration of child support payments as earned rather than as 
unearned income. 
We also suggest that the Maintenance-of-Effort/Hold Harmless provisions 
be modified to guarantee continued state supplements past the three-year 
implementation to the degree that no decrease in state supplementation be 
experienced by program participants. 
Other Recommendations 
We recommend that all departments and agencies be required to collect, 
tabulate, and analyze data relating to persons on the basis of sex in order to 
assess the impact of various governmental policies upon women. We more 
specifically recommend that female unemployment figures protray the true 
picture, that information of child care supply and demand be collected and 
published, and that the Bureau of the Census include in its collection of data 
the classification of married-female head of household. 
Finally, we recommend the use of gender-neutral language and concepts in 
all government proposals, regulations, and guidelines. 
26 
Sexual Inequities 
REFERENCES 
L U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Handbook of Women 
Workers, p. 9. 
2. Heather L. Ross and Isabel V. Sawhill, Time of Transition. 
3. U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook on Women Workers, p. 141. 
4. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Economic Problems of Women, 
Part I, p. 2. 
5. Ann Draper, "Why Women Work," p. 1. 
6. U.S. Congress (Senate), Child Care Data and Materials, p. 2. 
7. U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook on Women Workers, p. 32. 
8. The neutrality concept has been analyzed in Sawhill and MacDonald 
Welfare Policy and The Family and a working paper prepared by the HEW 
Family Impact Task Group for the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation (1978}. 
9. U.S. Congress (Senate), Women and Social Security, p. 8. 
10. Ibid. 
11. U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook on Women Workers , p. 11. 
12. U.S. Congress (Senate), Social Security Financing Proposals, p. 124. 
13. U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook on Women Workers, p . 13. 
14. Public Welfare "What's Really Happening?" , p. 29. 
15. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Economic Problems of Women 
Part I, p. 2. 
16. Ibid. p. 3. 
17. U.S. Department of Commerce, "Consumer Income," pp. 26-27. 
18. Ibid. p. 27. 
19. Woman Time, "Where We Are," p . 3. 
27 
Contemporary Welfare Reform Issues 
20. U.S. Department of Labor,'Handbook on Women Workers, p. 7. 
21. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Economic Problems of Women, 
Part I, p . 42. 
22. National Commission on the Observance of International Women's 
Year, "To Form a More Perfect Union," p. 49. 
23. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Federal Civil Rights Enforcement 
Effort, pp. 61-155 . 
24. National Commission on the Observance of International Women's 
Year, "To Form a More Perfect Union," p. 56. 
25 . Public Welfare, p. 18. 
26. National Commission on the Observance of International Women's 
Year, Plan of Action , p. 33. 
27. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Family, Poverty, and Welfare 
Programs, p. 113. 
28. Miriam Dinerman, "Women, Work, and Welfare," p. 475. 
29. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Income Security for Americans, 
p. 29. 
30. Colin C. Blaydon and Carol B. Stack, "Income Support Policies," 
p . 150. 
31. Ibid., p. 151. 
32. See U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Income Security for Ameri-
cans. 
33. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Economic Problems of Women, 
Part II, p. 412. 
34. Ibid. 
35. U.S. Department of HEW, Social Security Bulletin . 
36. Martha W. Griffiths, "Sex Discrimination," p. 543 . 
37. Ibid. p. 541. 
28 
Sexual Inequities 
38. U.S. Congress (House), Joint Hearings on the Administration's Welfare 
Reform Proposal, Part II. 
39. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Economic Problems of Women, 
Part II, p. 412. 
40. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Women and Poverty, p. 20. 
41. U.S. Congress (House), Joint Hearings, Part II. 
42. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Women and Poverty , p. 20. 
43. U.S. Congress (House), Oversight Hearings on CETA, p. 443. 
44. Ibid., p. 444. 
45 . Ibid., p. 448. 
46. U.S. Congress (Senate), Child Care Data and Materials , p. 18. 
47. Ibid., p. 20. 
48. Ibid., p. 18. 
49. Spokeswoman, "Child Care," p. 9. 
50. Synopses of Income Maintenance Programs. 
51. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Work, Welfare, and PBJ/, p. 45. 
52. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), National Survey of Food Stamps 
and Food Distribution Program and Recipients, p. 14. 
53. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Income Security for Americans , 
pp. 178-179. 
54. Blaydon and Stack, "Income Support," p. 151. 
55. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Work, Welfare, and PBJ/, p. 45 . 
56. U.S. Department of Commerce, "Consumer Income," p. 26. 
57. HR 9030, Program for Better Jobs and Income. 
58. A. Packer et al., "Women's Roles and Welfare Reform," p. 45. 
29 
Contemporary Welfare Reform Issues 
59. Ibid., p. 49. 
60. Interview with Ray Uhalde, Department of Labor. 
61. See Packer et al., "Women's Roles," pp. 45-50. 
62. Ibid., p. 48 . 
63. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Work, Welfare, and PBJI, p. 11. 
64. U.S. Congress (House),Joint Hearings on the Administration's Welfare 
Reform Proposal, Part II. 
65. Linda E. Demkovich, "A Job for Every Welfare Mother," p. 342. 
66. Information provided by Jodie Allen, Special Assistant to the U.S. 
Secretary of Labor. 
67. U.S. Congress (Senate and House), Work, Welfare, and PBJI, p. 17. 
68. Demokovich, "Welfare Mother," p. 344. 
69 . Testimony by Child Welfare League, November 1977, before the Joint 
Committee on Welfare Reform (unpublished). 
70. Demkovich, "Welfare Mother," p. 344. 
71. Child Welfare League, November 1977. 
72. U.S. Congress (Senate and House, Work, Welfare and PBJI, pp. 89-94. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alan Guttmacher Institute (1976) Abortion 1974-1975, Need and Services in 
the United States, Each State and Metropolitan Area . New York. 
Allen, Jodie T. (1972) A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Welfare 
Reform . Washington, D.C .: The Urban Institute. 
Annual Report (1976) Washington, D.C. : The Urban Institute. 
Bawden, Dennis Lee (1970) The Family Assistance Plan: An Analysis and 
Evaluation. Madison: The Urban Institute . 
30 
Sexual Inequities 
Blaydon, Colin C. and Carol B. Stack (1977) "Income Support Policies and 
the Family." Daedalus (Spring) . 
Bureau of the Census (1976) A Statistical Portrait of Women in the U.S. 
Washington, D.C. : U.S. Department of Commerce . 
Demkovich, Linda E. (1978) "A Job for Every Welfare Mother, But What 
About the Kids?" National Journal, March 4. 
Dinerman, Miriam (1977) "Catch 23: Women, Work, and Welfare ." Social 
Work, vol. 22, no. 6 . 
Draper, Ann (1977) "Why Women Work." Reprint from American Federa-
tionist, May issue. 
Griffiths, Martha W. (1974) "Sex Discrimination in Income Security 
Programs." Notre Dame Lawyer, vol. 49, no. 3. 
Kaplan, Barbara Lynn (1977) Judgments of the Fairness of the Social 
Security System by Men and Women. Unpublished thesis, Leonard David 
School of Gerontology, University of Southern California (August). 
Meyer, Charles W. (1969) A Base for the Negative Income Tax . Madison: 
Institute for Research on Poverty. 
Moore, Kristin A. and Steven V . Caldwell (1977) "The Effect of Government 
Policies on Out-of-Wedlock Sex and Pregnancy." Family Planning Perspec-
tives, vol. 9, no. 4 (July/ August) . 
National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year 
(1977) Proposed National Plan of Action . Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of State. 
National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year 
(1976) " . .. To Form a More Perfect Union .... " Washington, D.C.: 
Department of State. 
Packer, A., N. Gordon, and J. Allen (1978) "Women's Roles and Welfare 
Reform." Challenge, January-February. 
Public Welfare (1978) "What Is Really Happening with Women?" vol. 36 
(Winter). 
Ross, Heather L., and Isabel V. Sawhill (1975) Time of Transition: The 
Growth of Families Headed by Women. Washington, D.C. : The Urban 
Institute. 
31 
Contemporary Welfare Reform Issues 
Social Policy (1978) "Welfare Reform: A Critique." (January /February) . 
Spokeswoman (1976) "Child Care" (February). 
Synopses of Income Support Programs (1978) Austin: Lyndon B. Johnson 
School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin. 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1977) The Federal Civil Rights Enforce-
ment Effort - 1977. Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives . Congressional Record. (September 
12, 1977) "HR 9030: Administration's Welfare Reform Bill." Washington, 
D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office. H9280-H9302. 
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives . Subcommittee on Manpower, 
Compensation, and Health and Safety of the Committee on Education and 
Labor (1976) Oversight Hearings on Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act. Part 4-A, November, 94th Congress, 2d Session. Washington, 
D.C. : U.S. Printing Office. 
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Welfare Reform Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Agriculture, Committee on Education and Labor, and 
the Committee on Ways and Means (1977) Joint Hearings on the 
Administration's Welfare Reform Proposal , Part I and Part II (Unpub-
lished) 95th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Welfare Reform Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Agriculture, Committee on Education and Labor, and 
the Committee on Ways and Means (1977) Summary of Decisions as of 
December 16, 1977. (Working Paper, December 19, 1977). 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance (1977) Child Care Data and 
Materials. 95th Congress, !st Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Special Committee on Aging, Task Force on Women 
and Social Security (1975) Women and Social Security: Adapting to a 
New Era. 94th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on 
Finance (1975) Social Security Financing Proposals. 94th Congress, I st 
Session. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office. 
32 
Sexual Inequities 
U.S. Congress. Senate and House of Representatives. Joint Economic 
Committee (I 976) Work, Welfare, and the Program for Better Jobs and 
Income. 95th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D .C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
U.S. Congress. Senate and House of Representatives . Subcommittee on Fiscal 
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee (1974) Economic Problems of 
Women. Parts I-JV. 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Governm_ent Printing Office. 
U.S. Congress. Senate and House of Representatives . Subcommittee on Fiscal 
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee (I 974) Income Security for 
Americans: Recommendations of the Public Welfare Study . 93rd Congress, 
2d Session, December. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 
U.S. Congress. Senate and House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Fiscal 
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee (1974) National Survey of Food 
Stamps and Food Distribution Program Recipients: A Summary of 
Findings on Income Sources and Amounts and Incidence of Multiple 
Benefits. 93rd Congress, 2d Session, December. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. · 
U.S. Congress. Senate and House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Fiscal 
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee (1973) The Family, Poverty, and 
Welfare Programs: Factors Influencing Family Instability. Parts 1 and 2 , 
November and December, 93rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office . 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census (1977) "Consumer 
Income: Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the 
United States: 1976 (Advance Report) ." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation ( 1978) "Working Paper Prepared by 
the HEW Family Impact Tax Group" (unpublished). 
U.S . Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Adminis-
tration (1978) Social Security Bulletin (March) vol. 41, no . 3. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1977) Handbook of 
Labor Statistics 1977. Bulletin 1966. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
33 
Contemporary Welfare Reform Issues 
U.S. Department of Labor. Women's Bureau (1972) Federal Funds for Day 
Care Projects. Revised Pamphlet 14. Washington , D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
U.S. Department of Labor. Women's Bureau (1975) Handbook on Women 
Workers. Bulletin 297 . Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 
Womantime (1977) "Where We Are , Where We Might Be Going." November 
17-30. 
34 
PART II 
REGIONALISM: IT'S IMPACT ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AN EQUITABLE PROGRAM 
CHAPTER CONTENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
INTERNAL MIGRATION AND WELFARE REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
Migration and Federal Funding: Past Patterns and Current Trends . . . 41 
Future Implications for Federal Formulas and Options for Change . . . 43 
Changes in Welfare Allocations on Regional Disparities . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
REGIONALISM AND FISCAL RELIEF .. . . ......... . ........ 47 
Fiscal Relief as an Element of Welfare Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 
"Equity" Alternatives and Censtraints on Welfare Reform . . . . . . . . 53 
Federal Budgetary Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
"Grandfathering" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
"States' Rights" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
PBJI As a Feasible Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
Reduction in Benefit Level Disparities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
Reduction in State Welfare Funding Disparities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
State Reactions to Fiscal Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
State Relationships to Local Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
Voluntary State Supplementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... . .......... · . . · .. · . · · · · · · · · · · · . 69 
35 

REGIONALISM: ITS IMPACT ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AN EQUITABLE WELFARE PROGRAM 
EXECUTNE SUMMARY 
Current formulas for allocating federal welfare funds and state discretion 
in the expenditure of such funds have fostered the development of a welfare 
system in this country that is frought with inequities. This analysis identifies 
disparities in welfare expenditures that occur between two regions of the 
country, the North and the South, and it assesses the regional impact of the 
fiscal relief provisions of the Carter Administration's welfare reform 
proposals. 
Differing historical, political, economic, and social environments in the 
North and South have led these regions to provide for similafly situated poor 
citizens in different ways. While grounded in sociopolitical differences, 
current regional disparities in welfare policy and program implementation are 
now primarily defined in economic, rather than social, terms. Two types of 
fiscal inequities currently exist, one in benefit levels provided by the states 
and the other in state shares of welfare funding. Northern states pay both 
higher benefits and a greater proportion of the total costs of welfare programs 
than do Southern states. 
Limits on federal budget expenditures, the need to protect current 
high-benefit recipients in some states, and the premise of states' rights will 
constrain any attempt to achieve a system that is totally equitable. Attempts 
to develop fiscal relief measures that make the sharing of welfare costs more 
equitable between the states will take on "regionalistic" overtones as each 
section of the country applies its own self-favoring definition of "equity" in 
allocating this relief. The South favors equity measures based on notions of 
"fair shares", while the North favors a distribution related to current financial 
troubles that affect a state's "ability to pay." 
One goal of President Carter's proposal for welfare reform, the Program 
for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI), is to reduce the two kinds of regional 
economic disparities. PBJI calls for a federally guaranteed uniform minimum 
benefit level and new federal-state funding formulas that should result in 
significant savings for each state in financing its cash assistance program, both 
in the North and the South. 
Interregional migration patterns have implications for reducing regional 
economic disparities over the long term in welfare, just as past patterns have 
helped create the existing inequities. State reactions to the short-term fiscal 
relief provisions of PBJI are difficult to predict, and therefore the long-term 
effects on allocations of future state budgets are also relatively unknown. 
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Despite these uncertainties, the reforms of uniform minimum benefit levels 
and state fiscal relief embodied in PBJI are feasible approaches to a more 
equitable welfare system. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has always struggled to accommodate the differences of 
political, economic, and social systems of geographical regions within its 
national policies. With the exception of the Civil War, political compromises 
have been successfully hammered out in a forum that avoided sectional 
conflicts. However, neither the outcome of the Civil War nor these 
compromises has been able totally to eliminate regional identification among 
the nation's people. Even today, many citizens and their elected officials 
perceive a commonness in their needs for governmental services that cluster 
along regional geographical lines. Because of this, the nation is constantly in 
danger of losing its unified sense of purpose in providing its services for the 
welfare of all of its citizens. 
President Carter's Program for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) allows yet 
another chance for focusing national attention on the continued existence of 
regional differences within the country. Consideration of his proposal points 
out that the treatment a welfare participant receives now is greatly dependent 
on whether he/she lives in the Northern or Southern part of the country. 
Also, foderal funding formulas and internal migratory patterns have had and 
continue to have regional implications on the allocations of federal funds for 
income maintenance programs. 
The provisions of the current mix of programs have created two kinds of 
disparities in the welfare system. First, people in different states receive 
different levels of welfare benefits. Second, one state pays for more of the 
costs of its welfare programs than another state pays, with the federal 
government then picking up different proportions of the balance . The present 
welfare system, with these disparities, can therefore be seen as inequitable. 
From the point of view of the welfare recipient, the system is inequitable 
because it does not assure "like treatment for people in like circumstances" in 
different states. From the point of view of the states, the system is 
inequitable because states pay varying percentages of their total welfare 
expenditures. In the latter case, some states, mostly in the South, believe that 
each state should receive its fair share of fiscal relief. Others, mostly in the 
North, feel that a state's share of relief should be related to its financial need 
and its ability to pay the costs of supporting its welfare effort. 
The term "equity," as it is used in this paper, does not imply that the 
system will be "adequate" in its treatment of welfare recipients. Families on 
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welfare in different states can be treated equally, and thus, equitably, without 
receiving a benefit level adequate to meet their essential maintenance needs. 
Past state decisions and practices restrict the practical alternatives that will 
treat both individual recipients and individual state budgets in an equal, or 
equitable, manner at the same time. Three major constraints stem from 
"grandfathering," "states' rights," and federal budget limitations. Regional 
differences will persist. Some states, mostly those in the North, will feel a 
need to protect the financial interests of their current higher-benefit 
recipients. This is known as "grandfathering," and the concept requires a 
state to maintain its existing higher, and therefore technically inequitable, 
benefit levels to ensure that no family is made worse off just because of a 
change to a new program. In addition, other states, such as those in the 
South, cannot be forced to increase their own welfare expenditures against 
their wishes. This is called here the constraint of "states' rights," since such 
action is neither enumerated as a power of the federal government in the U.S. 
Constitution, nor can it be inferred from the powers that are enumerated. 
limits on the size of the federal budget will also constrain attempts to devise 
a welfare system that is both equitable and adequate and thereby overcome 
all regional disparities between recipients and between states. 
Yet, the provisions for a national minimum benefit level and the choice of 
formulas for attaining greater state fiscal relief contain in PBJI (H.R. 9030) 
offer feasible solutions to welfare reform that work within these constraints, 
and, in at least the short run, reduce the regional disparities faced by both 
recipients and states in the current welfare system. 
The long-term effect of PBJI's fiscal relief provisions and its relationship to 
regionalism are difficult to predict. For example, while PBJI attempts to 
reduce regional disparities, there is very little to prevent politicians from 
reinserting provisions in welfare proposals at a later date that will serve to 
financially favor one region over another. Previous actions taken by states 
when responding to changes in other similar income maintenance programs 
provide few clues about the regional variations that can be expected in 
response to current welfare reform proposals. Moreover~ there is no way to 
know whether the current political, social, and especially economic condi-
tions signal long-term shifts in each region or represent short-term aberrations 
in existing patterns. Specifically, current surpluses in Southern state budgets 
and deficits in Northern states may not be static conditions. Political 
decisions regarding resource allocations based only on short-run fluctuations 
may have unintended and detrimental consequences when conditions again 
change. Both the short- and long-term effects of fiscal relief through welfare 
reform on a state's relationship to its local governments, its reactions to 
voluntary supplementation provisions, and its commitment to social services 
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and other income maintenance programs, are difficult to project. 
The changes in benefit levels and state shares of funding welfare programs 
suggested by PBJI may, if adopted by Congress, establish precedents that 
other income maintenance programs may follow. What appears to be a 
marginal change now may be used later as the basis for other, more 
fundamen ta! changes. 
Other Definitions 
For purposes of the following analysis, the "North" is defined as the 
Northeast and North Central sections of the country, stretching along a line 
from Maine to Minnesota. This is the area commonly known as the 
"Frostbelt." The "South," or "Sunbelt," is the lower half of the country, 
from the South Atlantic states to Texas in the Southwest. The Western 
section of the country is not included in either region because the range 
of behavior of the Western states in relation to the major issues of welfare 
reform is too diverse to classify them as having group characteristics in 
common with either the North or the South. 
When discussing the relationships between regionalism, migration patterns, 
and welfare funding formulas, the term "welfare" refers to the broad range of 
income maintenance programs, such as cash payment, in-kind social services, 
employment, medical, and housing programs, all of which affect a family's 
ability to provide for its essential needs. The use of the term "welfare" when 
discussing equity in benefit levels and fiscal relief refers to the current and 
proposed cash payment programs, including Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), General Assistance 
(GA), and Food Stamps. Medicaid, while not a component of the cash 
payment program, has an important direct impact on it. Medicaid payments 
may affect a recipient's eligibility for cash assistance and vice versa. Also, 
medical services are the largest portion of a state's expenditures for income 
maintenance programs. However, Medicaid is not included in this analysis 
because the current reform proposal excludes it to allow for a future plan for 
National Health Insurance. 
Finally, benefit levels in each state are calculated on the basis of the 
payments in cash or its equivalent received monthly through the AFDC and 
Food Stamp programs by welfare participants with a family of four. 
INTERNAL MIGRATION AND WELFARE REFORM 
Regional variations in population have had a significant impact on the 
federal government's responsibility in the allocation of resources, particularly 
those destined for income maintenance programs. Using population figures as 
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a criterion, federal and state governments set limits on the number of elected 
officials representing each region in Washington and in state legislatures. 
Additionally , formula funding received by a region is determined by 
population figures and per capita income. These criteria ultimately reflect the 
importance of the region's economic vitality. Current population shifts, 
however, are beginning to hit hard at the federal government's continued use 
of population as a basis for the allocation of resources. These shifts are giving 
rise to a number of problems, problems that question the accuracy of 
population counts, estimates, and projections, and question the funding 
mechanisms used to allocate funds and the resultant regional disparities. The 
welfare reform programs contained in the Program for Better Jobs and 
Income (PBJI) will be yet another test of the already strained allocation 
mechanisms. Through it, the federal government will have to explore new 
methods of funding to ensure the fair and equitable distribution of resources 
to all participants while, at the same time, providing fiscal relief for the states. 
Migration and Federal Funding: 
Past Patterns and Current Trends 
It will not be easy for policymakers to prepare for the impact these 
current population shifts will have on the future distribution of resources 
unless they first understand how past patterns have influenced this process. 
Historically, there have been two major streams of internal migration in the 
United States. The first, occurring from 1820 to . 1890, was a massive 
East-West movement prompted by the availability of cheap land and · 
discoveries of gold and silver. Recent studies have shown that this East-West 
movement has continued, supported by increased job opportunities and 
retirement possibilities. The second stream, often called "a rural-urban 
movement" because of the large numbers of rural Southern blacks and whites 
who moved from the area to the urban North, began in 1891 and ended in 
1960. This latter stream can be divided into the three following periods 
(Eaton: 1971,pp.24-27and118-121): 
1. The Post Civil War Movement (1891-1910). With the removal of 
legal impediments to the movement of blacks to other parts of the 
country, and aided by increased job opportunities in the North, 
Southern blacks, along with many whites, moved to the North. 
2. Era of the Greats (1910-1941) . Included the "Great Migration" 
(1916-1931), the term generally given to the massive movement of · 
Southern blacks to the North, and the "Great Depression" (1931-
1940); also called the era of "stagnation" because of the increasing 
demand for jobs pitted against the decreasing supply of jobs. 
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3. The Era of Urbanization (1941-1960). It was during this time that 
the nation was experiencing vast economic gains and the cities, ex-
pecially Northern cities, were undergoing rapid growth. 
Except for the 1820-1890 migration, the general movement has been from 
the South to the North. This flow has led to the emergence of two vastly 
different regional economies. For the Frostbelt, the immigration of middle-
and upper-income producers, coupled with the region's existing middle- and 
upper-income population, led to a rise in the total per capita incomes of the 
region. Furthermore, the broadening of the region's tax base, brought on 
partly by an increase in the region's industrial productivity, had, until the 
early 1970s, made the Frostbelt the economic catalyst for the rest of the 
nation. The Sunbelt, on the other hand, due to declining industrial 
productivity and continued outmigration of large numbers of income 
producers, had, until recently, experienced limited growth and an uncertain 
economic future. During the 1950s, however, the Southern states, because of 
their declining populations and decreasing per capita incomes, were able to 
benefit from federal formulas that used low income as an allocation factor. 
But by 1968, due to the overall decline in the North, coupled with its 
sparsely populated areas, most federal grants had shifted to the North. 
Migration and federal funding patterns have generally worked to the 
advantage of the Frostbelt. These patterns brought into the area (along with 
large numbers of poor) a significant taxpaying population and industrial 
growth that led to an expanded tax base. A sound tax base, coupled with the 
growing "visibility" of poverty due to infrastructural deterioration, and 
differences in urban-rural perceptions of poverty, prompted some Frostbelt 
states to provide broad and relatively high-level public assistance benefits to 
the poor. Moreover, the expanded tax base improved the Frostbelt's capacity 
to match federal funds. This in turn led to an increase in the federal dollars 
being allocated to the area. For example, in the 1950s, during the height of 
the "urbanization" era, the states in the Frostbelt were receiving the lowest 
per capita grants.· By the 1970s they had become the prime grant receivers, 
supplanting the Western states,. the highest per capita grant receivers until 
then (U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations: 1977, p. 560). This is 
attributable to three factors: (1) increased emphasis by the nation 
(1955-1965) on research, which greatly benefited the Frostbelt states with 
their large number of research-oriented universities and institutes; (2) greater 
emphasis through New Frontier and Great Society programs on aid to states 
with densely populated urban areas, another plus for the Frostbelt; and (3) 
the region's capacity and apparent willingness to match federal funds. 
Since 1970, growing economic opportunity-especially in the Sunbelt-is 
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producing migration shifts from the North to the South in general, and from 
metropolitan to nonmetropolitan areas in particular. The shifts appear to be 
caused by the mover's desire to escape those factors that are contributing to 
the decline of the Frostbelt : harsh winters exacerbated by rising energy costs, 
decreasing public and private investment coupled with increasing taxes, and 
dwindling space for recreational activities. The metropolitan-to·non-
metropolitan shifts result from three factors: (1) easy access to the national 
metropolitan economy, brought on by advances in transportation; (2) 
changes in industrial trends : and (3) changes in the American lifestyle 
(Morrison, 1977). In both instances, the typical migrants have been the 
educated, managerial-scientific-technical, taxpaying white and black middle 
classes. 
The South-Southwest flow of this taxpaying group has left the older areas 
of the Frostbelt with the burden of maintaining a less educated, generally 
poorer, and frequently dependent population, while the Sunbelt gains 
taxpayers and continues to grow. Hence, what began in the 1960s as a 
method of unifying the country through the gradual migration of industry 
and population from the relatively rich Northeast to the relatively impov-
erished South and Southwest has, during the 1970s, "burst beyond the 
bounds that can be accommodated by existing political institutions." 
(Business Week, "Second War," May 1976). 
Future Implications for Federal Formulas 
and Options for Change 
The federal government uses various methods to allocate funds to the 
states. Most emphasize either program needs, generally measured by the 
population served, and/or financial needs, generally measured by per capita 
incomes. 
The reversal in migratory and funding patterns after the early 1970s has 
stimulated Frostbelt and Sunbelt states to seek changes in the way federal 
money is distributed. Recent Congressional debates have focused on 
formulas, particularly those that distribute federal monies on a per capita 
income basis (Congressional Quarterly, August 20, 1977). The Frostbelt 
states are concerned because the current formulas result in continued 
decreasing allocations (as they have since early 1970) to their region, and 
require them to shoulder a disproportionate share of the tax burden, despite 
their declining fiscal capacity to do so. They claim that they, not the Sunbelt, 
need federal money the most, and . that the . Sunbelt, due to its current 
economic growth, now has the capacity to take on a greater share of the tax 
burden. 
According to . Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D-Mass.), a driving force behind 
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the Northeast-Midwest Economic Advancement Coalition, this dispropor-
tionate tax burden shouldered by the Frostbelt is due to "a discrimination 
against the Northeast which has been going on for a long time ... ; the 
discrimination is the result of a consistent pattern of regional favoritism 
which is wholly inappropriate to today's economic needs" (National Journal, 
1976). The regional favoritism Harrington refers to is that the Frostbelt has 
been receiving relatively less than the Sunblet despite the region's perceived 
need for a larger share. It has only been the Frostbelt's capacity and 
willingness to match federal dollars that creates the appearance that its 
allocations are higher than those of the Sunbelt. The argument is that the 
federal government pays for a larger percentage share of welfare expenditures 
in the South than in the North. 
The coalition's main strategy for dealing with this problem is twofold: 
first, they will seek to make the public aware of the problem; and second, 
they will seek regional solutions. In May 1977, Harrington and his supporters 
scored a victory for the Frostbelt. Their success came through House passage 
of a Housing and Community Development bill (H.R. 6655) that included a 
new formula allowing for allocation of more federal funds to the cities of the 
Northeast and Midwest. The old formula was based on poverty, population, 
and housing overcrowding. The new formula added age of housing-a bonus 
for the Frostbelt, with its heavy concentrations of prewar construction, and a 
loss for the Sunbelt, where more of the construction is postwar (Congres-
sional Quarterly, August 20, 1977, p. 1747). While the new formula 
ostensibly favors the Frostbelt, it does not necessarily mean the Sunbelt will 
suffer long-term adverse effects from the change. The losses the region might 
experience will be short-lived, and as its housing stock grows older, its share 
of federal funds allocated by the formula will increase. 
What Harrington and his supporters were seeking in the passage of this new 
housing formula was equilibrium; that is, putting more money where it is 
needed without the effect of unfairly distributing federal dollars strictly for 
regional gains (Congressional Quarterly, August 20, 1977, p. 1748). But to 
reach this equilibrium it is obvious that dramatic changes in other federal 
formulas will be needed. As the debates over formula funding become more 
lively, policymakers from both the Sunbelt and the Frostbelt will offer 
funding options that reflect their regionally-linked definitions of equitable 
and adequate allocations. These options will likely focus on altering per 
capita income formulas by adding to them factors such as housing stock, 
unemployment, and cost-of-living adjustments. 
Currently, the alternatives focus on regional cost-of-living differences and 
the state's share of the tax burden. The first alternative passed its initial test 
when the House passed an amendment to the omnibus farm-food-stamp bill 
(H.R. 7171) on July 28, 1977 (Congressional Quarterly, July 1977, p. 1599). 
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With the adoption of this amendment, the House gave households pennission 
to deduct living costs from their income in detennining the amount of food 
stamps they receive. The inclusion of living costs may mean more people 
getting food stamps in the Frostbelt where rent, utility, and mortgage costs 
are highest in the nation; however, it may be of little benefit to the Sunbelt 
(Congressional Quarterly, August 20, 1977, p. 1751). 
Although this victory for the Frostbelt gives the impression that 
cost-of-living differences might be included in many future fonnulas, its 
inclusion will mean the consideration of more factors than proponents of this 
approach might realize. There are definite regional patterns in what families 
tend to do with their money, and there is no national standard to detennine 
what goods and services an "average" family needs to purchase (Congressional 
Quarterly, August 20; 1977, p. 1752). However, regional cost-of-living 
differences should be considered if what Business Week has termed "the 
further distortion of the federal effort" is to be prevented (Business Week, 
May 17, 1976,p.112). 
Alternatives that focus on the state's share of the tax burden, although 
much simpler, have not yet been tested, but all indications are that Sunbelt 
legislators will not be willing to accept this approach. Many believe that this 
approach would require states to raise taxes in order to increase their share of 
federal money received (Congressional Quarterly, August 20, 1977). 
Policymakers who favor fonnulas based on population counts were aided 
on October 17, 1976 when President Ford signed into law a bill that allows 
mid-decade population counts (P.L. 94-521). Beginning in 1985, Congress 
will be able to obtain enough data to adjust funding formulas to meet 
population changes. However, the argument continues that the increasing size 
and changing composition of the population makes the census obsolete after 
two or three years; hence, addition of a mid-decade census cannot provide a 
timely measure of population shifts among regions. 
Moreover, many local officials, particularly in densely populated innercity 
areas, fear that there is a great deal of undercounting-especially among 
minorities. Because of this undercounting, they believe first, that they are 
underrepresented in the U.S. House of Representatives and state legislatures, 
and second, that they suffer a loss in federal grants-in-aid and other payments 
that are distributed at least partially on the basis of population size (U.S. 
Senate Committee on Appropriations, 1977, pp. 249-256). 
Equilibrium will be hard to achieve as long as people continue to move, 
and people will continue to move as long as they find it economically and 
personally desirable to do so. Because of this continuous movement, future 
federal policies must counter the effects of regional in- and out-migration. 
The legislators from the Frostbelt and the Sunbelt will have to reach 
agreement over those factors to include in funding formulas that promote the 
45 
Contemporary Welfare Reform Issues 
twin goals of equity and adequacy in the distribution of funds, rather than 
merely regional favoritism, where one region tries to take advantage of 
another. 
Changes in Welfare Allocations 
on Regional Disparities 
Whatever changes occur in welfare allocations, for them to be effective in 
eliminating regional disparities, they must address two specific issues: 
(I) equitable and adequate distribution of resources among participants, and 
(2) equity in the proportional share of the total federal/state expenditures 
states must contribute in support of income maintenance programs. 
In the first instance, two forms of equity apply : case equity and horizontal 
equity. Case equity refers to the matching of economic resources with the 
participant's actual circumstances. Through this approach it would be 
possible to treat welfare participants on a case-by-case basis, thereby creating 
a system that is both adequate and equitable, and meets each participant's 
essential maintenance needs. This approach , however, would be an adminis-
trative nightmare and would not allow for the establishment of a national 
uniform benefit level-a major component of PBJI. 
Horizontal equity calls for the equal treatment of participants in like 
circumstances. Unlike case equity, horizontal equity does not call for the 
adequate treatment of participants ; it would only guarantee that resources are 
equally distributed among participants. It does, however , depend on the 
establishment of a uniform national benefit level. 
In the second instance, if efforts to reform the current welfare system are 
to be effective, they must address the question of fiscal relief. Inequities in 
the proportional shares paid by states and the federal government to support 
the welfare system must be eliminated. A truly equitable welfare system in 
this context must resolve differences in cost-of-living and benefit levels by 
regions. It must also answer the questions : what is fiscal relief and what is its 
role in welfare reform ; to what extent is equity a constraint on welfare 
refonn or does it provide feasible alternatives; how will and to what extent 
will the inclusion of fiscal relief eliminate regional disparities? Welfare reform 
must incorporate the principles of both case equity and horizontal equity. It 
must also be capable of treating individual cases separately ; hence , provisions 
should be made for cost-of-living adjustments at the local level. Additionally, 
it should treat similarly situated individuals equally through establishment of 
a uniform, if minimal, national benefit level. Finally, it should eliminate 
regional disparities in state expenditures through providing federal fiscal 
relief. PBJI embodies elements of each principle; subsequent analysis gives 
special attention to the principle of fiscal relief. 
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REGIONALISM AND FISCAL RELIEF 
Fiscal Relief as an Element of Welfare Reform 
When President Carter unveiled his Program for Better Jobs and Income 
(PBTI) in August 1977, the issue of fiscal relief for states became for the first 
time a key consideration in welfare reform. Past reform debates, such as with 
the Family Assistance Plan proposals of 1970, centered on the social effects 
of welfare reform. The concern then was about the impact of the programs 
on the poor, about the equal treatment of welfare recipients, and about the 
potentials for eradicating poverty. These issues have not vanished, but now 
share ·the limelight with the financial effects of welfare reform on federal, 
state, and local governments (Hamilton and Rabinovitz, 1977, p. 1). 
Economic conditions have changed since major welfare reforms were last 
initiated. Continuing inflation, recent recessions, and the near bankruptcy of 
New York City have made more people aware of the implications of the 
mismatch between state and local revenue sources and welfare expenditures. 
This recent attention to state and local spending for public cash assistance 
programs has shown that the current welfare system is not only "inequitable" 
in its distribution of benefits to recipients in different states, but it is 
similarly "inequitable" in the proportional share of contributions of resources 
to the system between the state and federal governments within different 
states. (Throughout this section of the paper, the use of the term "state" is 
usually meant to include both state and local governments within that state.) 
"Regionalism" enters into the debate over welfare reform because the 
inequities in the current system can be largely broken down on a regional 
geographical basis. Most of the states that offer high benefit levels to their 
welfare recipients are located in the Northern part of the country, and most 
of the lowest benefit states are in the South. Also, Northern states tend to 
spend more of their own money for public assistance programs than states in 
the South, where the federal government picks up most of the tab. For 
example, New York provides a benefit level that is l 02% ($511 a month) of 
the poverty threshold line ($500 a month for a family of four in 1976), and 
state and local governments pay for 47.2% of the costs. On the other hand, 
Texas provides a 53.8% benefit level ($269 a month) and pays for only 7% of 
the total costs (see Tables l and 2). * 
*New York and Texas were chosen as primary examples here to demonstrate 
regional differences mainly on the basis of the popular attention given to 
comparisons between the two states. However, they are near the extremes of 
their regions in benefit levels and funding shares, and thus may not be truly 
representative. 
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TABLE 1 
WELFARE SHARES* AND BENEFIT PAYMENTS 
Monthly 
State Benefit Percent of 
State Share Federal Share Payment Poverty Level 
(Percent) (Percent) (Dollars) (Percent) 
Alabama 9.4 90.6 $267 53.4 
Alaska 29.2 70.8 513 102.6 
Arizona 15.8 84.2 311 62.2 
Arkansas 8.6 91.4 269 53.8 
California 49.6 50.4 441 88.2 
Colorado 30.6 69.4 365 73.0 
Connecticut 43.l 56.9 458 91.6 
Delaware 32.7 67.3 376 75.2 
Florida 9.1 90.9 289 57.8 
Georgia 9.6 90.4 277 55.4 
Hawaii 43.3 56.7 589 117.4 
Idaho 26.6 73.4 415 83.0 
Illinois 42.8 57.2 394 78.8 
Indiana 23.5 76 .5 345 69.0 
Iowa 33.2 66.8 427 85.4 
Kansas 38.5 61.5 426 85.2 
Kentucky 12.5 87.5 336 67.2 
Louisiana 12.8 87.2 283 56.6 
Maine 25.2 74.8 367 73.4 
Maryland 42.4 57.6 343 68.6 
Massachusetts 50.1 49.9 447 89.4 
Michigan 46.0 54.0 488 97.6 
Minnesota 35.0 65.0 447 89.4 
Mississippi 3.5 96.5 213 42.6 
Missouri 26.3 73.7 289 57.8 
*Includes AFDC, SSI, General Assistance and Food Stamp programs 
Sources: 
4R 
Edward Hamilton and Francine Rabinovitz, Whose Ox Would Be Healed? 
The Financial Effects of Federalization of Welfare, Durham, NC: The 
Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs of Duke University, 
1977' pp. 83-92 . 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Selected Essays in 
Patterns of Regional Change. 95th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 593. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
WELFARE SHARES* AND BENEFIT PAYMENTS 
Monthly 
State Benefit Percent of 
State Share Federal Share Payment Poverty Level 
(Percent) (Percent) (Dollars) (Percent) 
Montana 20.2 79.8 347 69.4 
Nebraska 28.1 71.9 377 75.4 
Nevada 35.0 65.0 350 70.0 
New Hampshire 293 70.7 417 83.4 
New Jersey 40.1 59.9 427 85.4 
New Mexico 10.8 89 .2 319 63.8 
New York 47.2 52.8 511 102.2 
North Carolina 123 87.7 313 62.6 
North Dakota 22.8 77.2 432 86.4 
Ohio 29.9 70.1 349 69.8 
Oklahoma 47.9 52.1 373 74.6 
Oregon 23.0 77.0 477 95.4 
Pennsylvania 41.0 59.0 430 86.0 
Rhode Island 43.1 56.9 435 87.0 
South Carolina 4.0 96.0 255 51.0 
South Dakota 21.9 78 .. 1 464 80.8 
Tennessee 26.8 73 .2 264 52.8 
Texas 7.0 93.0 269 53 .8 
Utah 22.5 77.5 404 80.8 
· Vermont 29.8 70.2 441 88.2 
Virginia 23.8 76.2 388 77.6 
Washington 41.6 58.4 447 89.4 
West Virginia 8.6 91.4 350 70.0 
Wisconsin 42.7 57.3 468 93.6 
Wyoming 29.0 71.0 359 71.8 
*Includes AFDC, SSI, General Assistance and Food Stamp programs 
Sources: 
Edward Hamilton and Francine Rabinovitz, Whose Ox Would Be Healed ? 
The Financial Effects of Federalization of Welfare, Durham, NC: The 
Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs of Duke University, 
1977. pp. 83-92. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Selected Essays in 
Patterns of Regional Change. 95th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977 , p. 593 . 
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TABLE 2 
LARGEST AND SMALLEST STATE SHARES OF WELFARE FUNDING 
LARGEST SMALLEST 
State Share State Share 
Rank State (%) Rank State (%) 
I Massachusetts (N) 50.l 41 North Carolina (S) 12.3 
2 California 49.6 42 New Mexico 10.8 
3 Oklahoma (S) 47.9 43 Georgia (S) 9.6 
4 New York (N) 47.2 44 Alabama (S) 9.4 
5 Michigan (N) 46.0 45 Florida (S) 9.1 
6 Hawaii 43.3 46 West Virginia (S) 8.6 
7 Rhode Island (N) 43 .l 47 Arkansas (S) 8.6 
8 Connecticut (N) 43.l 48 Texas (S) 7.0 
9 Illinois (N) 42.8 49 South Carolina (S) 4.0 
10 Wisconsin (N) 42 .7 50 Mississippi (S) 3.5 
Differences in cost-of-living rates between the two areas do not account 
for all their differences in benefit levels. In 1975, the annual lower budget 
cost of living for a four-person family living in Austin, Texas was $8,412 
while a similar family in New York City would need $10,266 a year. This 
difference {18.1%) is significantly less than the difference (47.4%) in the 
range of welfare benefits between the two states (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
1977, pp. 270-271). 
Instead, these disparities may reflect some degree of regionalism in 
ideologies, or cultures, concerning welfare, and in political pressures for 
welfare rights between the Northern and Southern states. Motivations for 
helping the poor have undergone changes in our society from being a personal 
ethical and moral obligation to being a public legal responsibility. This 
evolution, though, has progressed at different rates in different regions of the 
country. The Northern states, prodded by strong welfare rights organizations, 
have responded to the cries for help from the poverty communities with more 
generous welfare benefits. The Southern states, lacking a pro-welfare 
ideology , tend to regard the receipt of welfare as a "privelege" which is 
begrudgingly granted by the states to people who often abuse it. Each state is 
allowed to set the benefit levels for its own welfare recipients, primarily 
through the AFDC program. Benefit levels in turn affect the amount of food 
stamps that can be received. The differences in welfare ideologies result in 
Southern states providing low benefits and Northern states granting higher 
benefits. 
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Fiscal relief through welfare reform has acquired a regionalist perspective 
because both Northern and Southern states believe that they "deserve a break 
today" from the burdens of financing welfare. Both regions spell relief 
''M-0-N-E-Y," and each wants to obtain as much as possible. However, each 
region has a different definition for determining the relief it deserves. The 
Northern or Frostbelt states claim they deserve relief on the basis of need; 
their expenditures for larger shares of the total costs of welfare are placing 
increasing burdens on their limited budgets. These Frostbelt states believe 
they are "losing out" in the game of financing public assistance. They are 
finding it difficult to break out of a self-defeating, vicious cycle: poor 
economic conditions place new and larger demands on the welfare system; 
economic recessions make even less money available to the governments 
through state and local taxes; to maintain current levels of services, states 
must raise the tax rates to raise more money to finance welfare; the higher 
tax rates induce more people and businesses to leave the area in search of 
better competitive tax advantages; the original area is left with an even 
narrower tax base on which to base its welfare expenditures; the demand for 
welfare grows again as even fewer jobs are available; and so on. 
Some Sunbelt observers believe the increasing burdens that welfare has 
placed on Frostbelt states result from their own mismanagement. If those 
states did not offer their recipients such high benefits, they say, it would cost 
them less money. The Northern states are living beyond their means, beyond 
their capacity to finance the services they have decided to deliver. These 
Northern states, according to these observers, are now looking to be bailed 
out, to be further rewarded with more money for their past mistakes. 
There may be truth in the accusations. Northern states may be beginning 
to realize that their decisions to pay higher benefits were perhaps not the 
most fiscally responsible choices. Yet, those original decisions were made in a 
different financial and social context. The strains that city and state finances 
have experienced in the 1970s were not predicted in the 1960s when the 
severe needs of the poverty community were being "discovered" and 
legitimate responses were being made to meet those needs by the Northern 
states. Also, many of the problems that have led to financial difficulties for 
Northern states are beyond the scope of a single state's control, such as 
nationwide economic recessions, inflation, and inclement weather. 
However, once a family gets used to living on a $20,000 a year income, it 
is very difficult suddenly to have to adjust to living on only $10,000 a year. 
This is basically what has happened financially in the North. If a family 
overextends itself and conditions change, then it has to cut back on its 
spending. likewise, a state may have to cut back on the services it delivers if 
it cannot raise taxes without risking comparing unfavorably with other states 
competing for population and businesses. Some Northern states have reduced 
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services as a response to their recent financial pressures. For example, 
Massachusetts has decreased its welfare load by dropping programs and target 
groups and lowering ceilings for recipients (Hamilton and Rabinovitz, 1977, 
p. 114). However, what is moot distressing about this almost necessary step, 
in lieu of increased federalization of the welfare system as PBJI proposes, is 
that those people remaining in the financially troubled states, the poor and 
the elderly, are forced to bear the brunt of the welfare service cutbacks. 
These people have the greatest need for the services and will suffer most from 
their absence or reduction. From an ethical standpoint, it is difficult to ask a 
family receiving an inadequate income through the welfare system for its 
essential needs of food, clothing, and shelter to try to "get by" on less money 
or services because of cutbacks in assistance and services. This is especially the 
case when the opportunities for obtaining jobs that might lead to independ-
ence from the welfare system are almost nonexistent in these same areas of 
declining economies and fleeing industries, such as the states and localities in 
the North. 
On the other hand, the Southern states claim that they deserve their "fair 
share" of any fiscal relief proposal. "Equity" to them is the belief that all 
states should be treated alike and receive equal amounts of relief dollars. 
They believe that they should not be forced to "subsidize" the Northern 
states, or be forced to pay larger shares of their own recently growing tax 
dollars to pay for the mistakes of the Northern states. This reasoning seems to 
be in line with the "fundamentalist" Southern viewpoint regarding "welfare": 
that every individual, and thus, state, can and therefore should "make it on 
his own" in this country without help from others. 
However, these Southern beliefs tend to ignore the fact that most 
Southern states pay less than 10% of the total cost of welfare expenditures in 
their states. It is then difficult to agree that these Southern states have "made 
it on their own" in providing this service of government, while Northern 
states, like New York and Massachusetts, pay closer to 50 percent of their 
welfare costs. Tax dollars from the North are actually helping to subsidize the 
South's welfare system. The Northern states have chosen to provide higher 
benefits to their welfare recipients, yet they have shown a willingness to 
shoulder greater proportions of the costs needed to support those "generous" 
higher benefit levels. The Southern states have avoided this potential financial 
dilemma by not being generous in the first place. The complicating factor in 
the Southern discussion of "equity" in fiscal relief as translated as equal 
treatment for like circumstances to all states, is that the circumstances are not 
alike between states. Southern states want an equal share of the relief pie, but 
they do not need an equal share. Southern states pay the lowest benefits and 
the smallest shares of welfare costs. Yet, because of their expanding 
economies, populations, and tax bases, they do have the financial ability, 
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which Northern states seem to be losing, to improve and expand both 
benefits and funding. However, one might predict that they are the states 
least likely to do so on their own. Texas, for example, has had a substantial 
operating budget surplus in recent years (Hamilton and Rabinovitz, 1977, p. 
44). Yet, past priorities in its state expenditures have not been for welfare 
programs. 
Regional disparities therefore do exist under the current welfare system, 
both in benefit levels and in proportional shares of state versus federal welfare 
funding. These disparities are then reflected in regional perceptions of fiscal 
relief. Given that existing legislation allows a state to determine the level of 
benefits that will be provided within its boundaries, these disparities are 
seemingly "caused" by the underlying differences in regional ideologies about 
welfare. Ideologies are personal, and it is hard to say that one person's 
opinion is "better" or "more correct" than another's. The regional 
distinctions in ideologies are embedded in the nation's history. Despite the 
end of the Civil War and the nation's efforts to unify its different sections, 
regionalism in modes of thought still exists today. It is much more difficult, if 
not impossible, to change personal ideologies which are reflected on political 
actions, such as state-by-state differences in welfare benefits and funding. One 
single federal government program cannot achieve a consensus on either 
welfare ideology or programs. The most one federal initiative can realistically 
do is to design policies and programs more toward desirable, equitable 
change. If the federal government cannot directly work at the root causes of 
inequities in the current welfare system, it can attack its symptoms by 
reducing the disparities between states both for recipients and for state 
budgets. 
"Equity "Alternatives and 
Constraints on Welfare Reform 
The design of any welfare reform proposal is constrained by regional 
ideology. Three other constraints, mentioned earlier, significantly affect the 
final shape of a reform proposal: (I) federal budgetary limits, (2) the 
"grandfathering" of current recipients, and (3) "states' rights." Because these 
constraints frustrate attempts to achieve fully the goal of equity for both 
welfare recipients and the states, they must be taken into account by any 
reform proposal that intends to be politically, socially, and economically 
feasible and to have any chance at all to be passed by Congress. 
Federal Budgetary Limits 
One suggested method of achieving full equity in welfare programs is by 
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complete federalization of the welfare system. Under this plan, the federal 
government pays all current state and local costs of welfare and provides a 
minimum benefit level up to 100% of the official poverty line. This plan is 
probably the most desirable to those, such as the Northern states, who 
currently feel the most financially strained by the present method of welfare 
funding. Each state would receive 100% fiscal relief. 
However, this alternative is not financially feasible ; it places undue strain 
on an already pressured federal budget. Full federalization of the major 
welfare programs (AFDC, SSI, General Assistance, and Food Stamps) would 
have relieved all state and local governments of almost $7 billion in 1975, $4 
billion of which would have come from the takeover of the AFDC program 
(Hamilton and Rabinovitz, 1977, pp. 83-92). To the extent that the federal 
government alone would guarantee a minimum benefit level higher than 
existing levels, especially in the South, the total amount of extra federal 
money spent for welfare would rise accordingly. fu 1975, the federal 
government expenditures for these welfare programs were $20 billion. It is 
doubtful whether the nation will pay or can afford an increase of $7 billion 
or more (35 percent of the current federal cash assistance costs) in future 
years to the federal budget for welfare. All federal government financing is 
being viewed as more of a zero-sum game than it has in the past. National 
policymakers realize that the country cannot afford to continuously increase 
the size of the pie through larger amounts of deficit spending. The pie is seen 
as more finite than before ; what is spent in one area cannot be spent in 
another. The persistence of high inflationary and unemployment rates and 
the slower rates of recovery from recessions are often blamed on the federal 
government as representing the costs of trying to increase the size of the pie 
without substantively adding more filling, or without increasing taxes to pay 
for increased spending. The money to pay for the programs must come from 
somewhere. To quote a trite phrase, "There is no free lunch." 
A total balancing of the budget is probably not a realistic goal . Achieving 
it would require either severe cutbacks in federal programs or severe increases 
in federal taxes, neither of which is politically acceptable and thus would not 
easily be passed by Congress. Budget balancing as a guide, though, would not 
leave much room for increases for welfare spending. It would also require 
establishing budget priori ties. This may be desirable in a "zero-based 
budgeting" sense of setting more realistic goals and directions for the 
government to follow. However, establishing priorities is difficult to do in the 
national political arena where a greater number and diversity of interests, 
each claiming to deserve highest priority, must increasingly be accommo-
dated. The allocation of the nation's scarce resources is not an economic 
process , but a political one (Business Week, January 30, 1978, p. 66). Given 
these constraints, full federalization of welfare programs as a means for 
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achieving equity in the system is not likely now. Increased federal spending 
for any welfare reform proposal must occur in a way that furthers the fiscal 
integrity of the federal budget. 
"Grandfathering" 
A second suggestion for attaining equity is by a federal guarantee of a 
uniform minimum benefit level at less than 100 percent and the continuation 
of the current shared federal-state responsibility for financing public 
assistance, but equalized for all states at a rate equal to the current lowest 
share being paid by a state. This approach also results in near-total 
federalization since the lowest state share is about 3.5 percent in Mississippi, 
which would set the federal share at 96.5 percent. This method of achieving 
equity offers the same advantages as total federalization in providing large 
amounts of fiscal relief to those states most in need of it. However, because 
this proposal is so close to total federalization, it suffers from the same 
constraints and drawbacks-a federal finite budget. 
But the major weakness of this second suggestion for equity is that it only 
guarantees a minimum b_enefit level that is lower than what is now paid to 
some welfare recipients. If only the lower level is assured, there is a risk that 
the current higher benefits will be reduced, and some will be made worse off 
merely as a result of the transition to a new system. Again, those who would 
suffer the most from this reduction are those least able to bear the burden of 
such a cutback. For example, a family in New York that is currently receiving 
benefits around I 00 percent of the level of poverty might be asked suddenly 
to try to survive on less money. The adjustments would be very difficult and 
required only because the system had been changed. The argument that the 
government has a moral (and political) obligation to assure that those most 
vulnerable to change do not suffer from it is the second major constraint that 
a welfare proposal must take into account. This second suggested method will 
require state governments to "grandfather" those currently receiving benefits 
at rates higher than what the federal government will guarantee. To do this, 
state governments, mostly those in the North, will have to supplement the 
federal payments up to at least the current levels. Obviously, the extent to 
which a state supplements the federal minimum benefit level reduces the total 
amount of fiscal relief that could be obtained if no extra payments were 
made. 
This is not an absolute constraint, though as mentioned earlier, some states 
have cut back on their welfare services in response to recent fiscal problems. 
However, this is viewed as a last resort action. It is assumed that whatever 
political and social forces originally led to state action of providing higher 
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benefits are still existing to some degree in those states. This will serve to 
make it difficult to obtain political approval for such cutbacks. 
"States' Rights" 
A third suggestion for achieving equity in the welfare system is to have the 
federal government guarantee a uniform minimum benefit level less than 100 
percent and to set the proportional share of state welfare financing at an 
equal rate for all states, lower than present for some, yet higher than present 
for others. For instance, a compromise between the current extremes of state 
shares would set the share at about 25 percent for all states: the federal 
government would pay 75 percent of the minimum benefit level and the state 
would pay the other 25 percent. However, even this proposal has its 
drawbacks. As in the second suggestion, a guaranteed benefit set below any 
state's currently provided level will require that state to supplement, and thus 
reduce, its potential fiscal relief. 
This proposal does have some advantages over the other suggested 
equity-achieving models . It would put less strain on the federal budget and 
may thus be "affordable." An overall state share of around 25 percent is near 
the present total average state and local share of 34.8 percent of welfare 
expenditures (Hamilton and Rabinovitz, 1977' pp. 83-92). It is. equitable in 
that all states would be treated alike. Given the current state of regional 
economic growth patterns, this proposal would grant large shares of fiscal 
relief to those states in the North who need the aid and would require larger 
shares of payments from those states in the South that are currently 
economically well off and growing. In this manner, this proposal might seem 
more "fair," as those predominantly Southern states which can afford to pay 
larger shares of welfare costs than they are now paying would be asked to do 
so. 
However, the legal and political constraint of "states' rights" would 
prevent this suggestion from being adopted. By "states' rights," it is meant 
that the federal government cannot constitutionally force a state to spend 
more than it is currently spending if the state does not agree to spend more. 
By law, the federal government cannot tell the states how they must spend 
their own money. The expenditure of state-generated revenue is solely the 
domain of the state government. Even if it mandated national eligibility 
· criteria and benefit levels, the federal government cannot force Texas, or any 
other low-benefit, low-share state, to increase its share of welfare financing 
from its current level of 7 percent up to 25 percent (or to any level above 7 
percent). A low-share, low-benefit state might agree to increase its percentage 
share of a welfare program's costs only if its total dollar contributions did not 
increase. For example , if Texas is currently paying $7 out of a total 
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federal-state payment of $100, then it might agree to pay 25 percent of a 
program where the total payment was $28. If the number of recipients is the 
same in either case, then each will receive less money than before. This 
approach actually increases disparities in benefit levels between high- and 
low-benefit states, rather than making them more equitable. 
The federal government can follow the pattern it set when it federalized 
the SSI program in 1974, and required mandatory state supplementation. 
Under that program, a state was not allowed to receive any federal money for 
SSI recipients unless it agreed to supplement the federal minimum benefit 
level up to current levels at the time of program implementation. This 
provision was included to ensure that no current recipient would be worse off 
as a result of the program change. Extending this to the major welfare 
programs, the federal government might make the receipt of the federal 75 
percent share totally conditional on a state providing the other 25 percent 
share. This is the present method of state matching required for welfare 
programs. However, matching formulas can only be offered as an incentive to 
a state to provide more and spend more than it might otherwise if the state 
were to try to finance its welfare programs on its own. Again, a state cannot 
be required to spend more than it wants. A state also cannot be forced to 
accept federal money and the strings that often come with it if it chooses not 
to supply the matching funds. The question to be resolved here is, "What 
happens if the state refuses to accept federal funds because its required 
matching contribution is more than what it is currently paying?" Under this 
third alternative, this question will confront all low-benefit, low-share states, 
which are primarily located in the South. For example, in Texas, 25 percent 
of its current total welfare payments of $765 million would be $191 million, 
which is much more than its 7 percent present payment of $53 million. If a 
state refuses to accept any federal money under the new plan and thus greatly 
decreases the total amount of money spent in the state for public assistance, 
what will happen to the current welfare recipients in those states? Most 
likely, it would conflict with the second constraint of assuring that current 
recipients do not suffer from the change in programs, and again, greater 
disparities in benefit levels would result. It is not clear whether under this 
third suggestion the social and political pressures in the low-benefit, low-share 
antiwelfare states in the South would be strong enough to overcome the 
temptation to refuse federal money with strings attached, and instead, 
encourage a state to increase its share of state money allocated to welfare 
programs. 
Even if the federal government could legally require a state to increase its 
spending for a welfare program, any legislation that called for imposing such 
requirements and thereby increasing the cost to Southern states, would 
probably be strongly resisted by their elected officials. Therefore, the legal 
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and political restrictions on the federal mandating of the use of state money 
will require any welfare reform proposal to take account of the issue of 
"states' rights." 
PBJl as a Feasible Alternative 
The Carter Administration has taken these three constraints into account. 
The broad concepts relating to benefit levels and state fiscal reliev embodied 
in PBil offer a legitimate, feasible compromise to the welfare reform goal of 
achieving a more equitable welfare system. Although the promise of fiscal 
relief as a selling point for the program risks introducing regiooalistic 
arguments into the debate, PBil attempts to downplay regionalism as an issue 
in welfare reform. Not everyone will be satisfied with the compromises that 
have been made, but the proposal is a reasonable and realistic approach to 
attaining equity in benefits and costs. The chances of like people in like 
circumstances being treated alike by the welfare system without regard to 
where they live will be increased. Regional disparities in benefits and in state 
sharing of financing welfare will not be eliminated by PBil, but they will be 
significantly reduced. 
Reduction in Benefit Level Disparities 
PBJI calls for a federally guaranteed uniform minimum benefit level of 65 
percent of the official poverty line and for national eligibility requirements 
for the welfare program. The Carter Administration recognizes that the 65 
percent level ($325 a month) is an inadequate income for many, but it 
reflects the cost the federal government can afford to guarantee. This level is 
greater than what is currently provided in thirteen states, most of them 
located in the South. States can and are encouraged to supplement the federal 
minimum payment up to higher, more adequate levels. 
While state supplementation is voluntary, most Northern states will have 
to supplement the minimum benefit to guard against reducing benefits 
currently greater than 65 percent of the poverty line. To both assure that 
Northern states will still receive substantial amounts of fiscal relief after 
necessary supplementation and offer incentives to Southern states to provide 
additional benefits beyond the federal minimum, PBJI proposes that the 
federal government share the costs of state supplemental payments. As long 
as federal criteria regarding benefit reduction rates are followed, the federal 
government will pay for 75 percent of the first $500 (1232 percent) of the 
federal minimum payment) in state supplements (for a family of four) and 25 
percent of additional supplementation either up to 75 percent of the official 
poverty line if the family has a member required by the program to seek 
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employment, or up to 100 percent of the poverty line otherwise. A state may 
still have to provide further supplements, which will not be federally 
matched, in order to fully "grandfather" current high benefit recipients. Yet, 
if the sum of a state's share of expenditures under the new program, plus its 
matched and unmatched supplements, is greater than 90 percent of its share 
under the existing program, then the states will be "held harmless" during the 
first five years . of the program for the excess expenditures. The federal 
government will pay for this excess in order to guarantee that every state The 
broad concepts relating to benefit levels and state fiscal relief embodied in 
PBJI maintain existing levels of high benefits and "hold harmless' payments 
will probably not apply to most Southern states, they are encouraged to take 
advantage of the federal sharing in the cost of matching supplements to raise 
the benefit levels in their states above 65 percent and closer to 100 percent of 
the poverty line. 
By taking away the element of state-by-state decisions on benefit levels 
and eligibility standards, the regional disparities will be reduced. Welfare 
recipients in the South will be the primary beneficiaries of this move as their 
benefit levels, currently ranging from 42 percent to 58 percent, are raised to 
65 percent ($325) of the poverty threshold. Excluding Alaska and Hawaii, 
the nationwide range of disparity in recipient benefit levels will decrease from 
a current difference of 59.4 percent, or $298, to_a_ difference of 37 percent,' 
or $186, thus producing an overall reduction of 37 percent (see Table 3). 
Reduction in State Welfare Funding Disparities .1 
Second, realistic attempts to reduce the disparities between state costs for 
welfare programs are also incorporated in the PBil proposal, After the 
three-year implementation period, a state is allowed to choose its state share, 
or "state maintenance of effort," between (a) 90 percent of its current 
(1977) state cash assistance payments, or (b) 10 percent of the total cost of 
the new program within the state in that future year. A state will obviously 
choose for itself the least expensive route. Past states' actions suggest that 
their choices will follow a predictable pattern. The high-benefit, high-share 
Northern states will choose to pay 10 percent of the total cost of the 
reformed welfare program, plus what it must supplement. Since current 
benefit levels in these states are higher than the federal guaranteed minimum, 
the total cost of the new program, including state supplements, will not be 
much different from the cost of the for 75 percent of the first $500 (12.32 
percent of the federal minimum payment) in state proportionate share of the 
total cost that will be paid by the state and local governments. For example, 
New York state and local governments are currently paying 47.2 percent of 
the cost of welfare expenditures in the state. Under PBJI, New York would 
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0 TABLE3 
RANGE OF DISPARITIES IN BENEFIT LEVELS 
Pre-Reform 
High Low 
State New York Mississippi 
Benefit Level (monthly) $511 $213 
*Percentage of Poverty Level 102% 42.6% 
NET REDUCTION RATE 
*$500 a month for a family of four 
Sources : 
Difference 
$298 
59.4% 
$298 - $186 
$298 
High 
New York 
$511 
102% 
= 37% 
Post-Reform 
Low Difference 
Mississippi 
$325 $186 
65% 37% 
Edward Hamilton and Francine Rabinovitz, Whose Ox Would Be Healed? The Financial Effects of Federalization of 
Welfare, Durham, North Carolina: The Institute of Policy Sciences and Affairs of Duke University, 1977, pp. 83-92. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Selected Essays in Patterns of Regional Change, 95th Congress, 
1st Session, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 593. 
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have the option of paying either (a) 90 percent of its current share (42.5 
percent) or (b) 10 percent of total cost, plus increased shares for state 
supplementation. Supplementation payments in a state like New York that is 
currently providing a benefit level above 100 percent of the poverty line 
would be a very substantial share of the total costs. If the federal government 
did not share in the costs of supplementation and if the federal government 
guaranteed only $65 out of every $100 paid to welfare recipients, then the 
state would have to pay an additional $25 · in supplementation, plus its 
automatic $10 share (a total of $35), in order to ensure that the welfare 
participant does not receive less than the $100 he/she is currently being 
provided. However, this new 35 percent share is still significantly less than the 
47.2 percent it is currently paying, or the 42.5 percent it would pay under 
the first option. Thus, New York achieves a large degree of fiscal relief and a 
lesser share of the welfare burden, while still protecting current recipients 
against benefit reductions. Some relief is better than none for the Northern 
states. Since the federal government pays for much of the costs of 
supplementation, the amount of fiscal relief will increase, and the state share 
of the total welfare costs will decrease accordingly. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the low-benefit, low-share states in the 
South will choose the first option of paying 90 percent of current state costs. 
In a low-benefit state, such as Texas, the total costs of the reformed program· 
will increase as the federal government guarantees a cash payment of 65 
percent of the poverty level for all cash assistance recipients, instead of the 
53.8 percent that is presently provided, assuming that the total number of 
participants is not reduced. If Texas were asked to pay 10 percent of the 
costs of a more expensive program, its expenditures would be substantially 
increased; and its share of the total costs would increase above its current 
level of 7 percent. However, this approach violates the constraint that 
restricts the federal government from requiring a state to spend more of its 
own money. By pegging the state share to a level below current state costs, . 
PBn will grant fiscal relief to these Southern states, too. The percentages of 
relief may even be as large for Southern states as for Northern states since 
Southern states will not need to supplement the higher federal benefit 
payments. Also, the proportional share of total welfare expenditures by 
Southern states will actually decrease greatly as the total costs of the new 
program rise and the states contribute less money than they are currently 
paying. For example, after reform, Texas will be paying 4 percent of the total 
welfare costs, instead of its current 7 percent. Although the Southern states 
may now have a greater capacity to shoulder larger shares of the costs due to 
their current budget surpluses, these states will also have to be granted fiscal 
relief if the federal government's goal of achieving greater equity through 
higher uniform benefit levels is to be accomplished and given that it cannot 
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force a state to increase its own share of welfare expenditures. PBJl's element 
of choice in determining state maintenance efforts is necessary to assure that 
both Northern and Southern states receive maximum fiscal relief within the 
constraints that face all reform proposals. 
Disparities between states in their shares of financing welfare will be 
reduced by PBJI in that most Northern states will have their shares reduced 
to at most 35 percent of the total costs. The overall range of disparities in this 
instance will decrease from a current difference of 46.6 percent to a new 
difference of 33.7 percent, a net reduction of 27 .7 percent (see Table 4). 
State Reactions to Fiscal Relief 
Despite regional disparities in current welfare programs, it is unclear 
whether "regionalism" can be used to predict how states will react to the 
fiscal relief they might gain through PBJI. States will be pressured to spend 
their "savings" in as many ways as there are interests competing for the 
states' services or aid. One action a state might take is to do nothing but 
pocket the savings and reduce the state's total expenditures. However, given 
the pressures from the growing number of competing interests demanding 
accommodation, this step of "no action" is unlikely. The political strength. of 
these interests will probably determine where this money saved from welfare 
programs will ultimately be spent. Past priorities of state expenditures may 
serve to guide future state uses of additional funds. For example, Texas lacks 
precedents to devote new sources of money to welfare functions. Instead, its 
fiscal relief money might be spent in building more highways. If similar 
interest groups are politically stronger in one region of the country than in 
another, then state reactions to the use of fiscal relief funds may likewise vary 
regionally. 
State Relationships to Local Governments 
A few states, most notably New York, have granted special taxing powers 
to certain city and/or county governments in order to help finance their 
welfare burden. With the decreased state commitment to welfare expendi-
tures offered through the fiscal relief provisions of PBJI, there may be 
pressures on these state legislatures to remove these special revenue-generating 
powers. Such a move, though, would have implications for the affected cities 
far beyond just its expenditures for welfare programs. 
PBJI hopes to create the opposite reaction in these states that share 
welfare financing with local governments. As a condition for being eligible for 
"hold harmless" regionally defined approaches states may pursue when 
confronted with a program with pass on to the local governments a share of 
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TABLE4 
RANGE OF DISPARITIES IN STATE WELFARE FUNDING 
Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
High Low Difference High Low Difference 
State Massachusetts Mississippi Massachusetts Mississippi 
Percentage Paid by State 
of Total Welfare Costs 50.1% 3.5% 46 .6% 35% 1.3% 33.7% 
NET REDUCTION RATE 46.6% - 33 .7% = 27 73 46.6% . 0 
Sources: 
Edward Hamilton and Francine Rabinovitz, Whose Ox Would Be Healed? The Financial Effects of Federalization of 
Welfare, Durham, North Carolina: The Institute of Policy Sciences and Affairs of Duke University, 1977, pp. 83-92. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Selected Essays in Patterns of Regional Change, 9Sth Congress, 
1st Session, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 593. 
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the fiscal relief proportionate to their contribution to the state's total welfare 
expenditures. However, after this initial period, PBJI makes no assurances of 
financial relief to the cities through welfare reform. Ll>cal governments owe 
their creation to the state governments. Given the expansion and growing 
political strength of the nonmetropolitan areas of the states, the reactions of 
states to their local, especially urban, governments resulting from increased 
federalization of welfare will not necessarily be beneficial to the local units in 
the future. However, regionalism is not much of a factor here; most of the 
states that require local contributions to the state welfare effort are located 
only in the North. 
Voluntary State Supplementations 
The possibility exists that money gained through PBJl's fiscal relief 
provisions may be used by states to increase their supplementation of benefit 
levels. PBJI seems intended to foster this approach for current low-benefit, 
predominantly Southern states, whose benefit levels will be guaranteed only 
up to the federally-provided minimum of 65 percent of the poverty line. As 
stated earlier, the federal government promises matching funds as an incentive 
for state supplementation of benefits. Also, if a state must spend more than 
90 percent of its current expenditures to maintain existing higher benefit 
levels under the new program, the federal government will pay for this excess 
under "hold harmless" provisions. 
However, there are limits to the federal budget's ability to absorb increases 
in benefit levels. These "hold harmless" payments will apply for only the first 
five years of transition to the new program. After that time, if a high-benefit 
state needs to maintain or wants to increase benefit levels above what the 
federal government is capably willing to support through federal participation 
in state supplements, the states will have to bear the added costs alone. Such 
an increase may be likely as the public debate surrounding the adoption of a 
new program focuses attention on the inadequacy of current benefit levels. In 
order to realize substantial savings from fiscal relief and a reduction in its 
share of financing welfare, a high-benefit state will have to resist this pressure 
to raise benefit levels further, and rely on the federal government to make the 
system adequate as efforts in this field. 
Federalization of the SSI program in 1974 provides the only hints of 
regionally defined approaches states may pursue when confronted with a 
program with similar provisions for additional voluntary supplementation. 
However, one must remember that the public and their state governments 
tend to take a more generous attitude toward the SSI categories of aged, 
blind, and disabled recipients. Also, the figures do not account for possible 
increases in the number of program recipients that resulted from new national 
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eligioility requirements. Yet, the data show that although this program was 
originally intended to ·reduce state expenditures, eleven states actually 
increased state spending under the program, and eight of these states were 
located in the North. Eleven states provide no optional supplements, and 
eight of them are found in the South. Texas, for e~ample, is barred by its 
State Constitution from paying any supplements, voluntary or mandatory 
(Hamilton and Rabinovitz, 1977, pp. 106-IC)<J). 
Social Services 
Another major concern is what a state's reaction will be toward its 
maintenance-of-effort in providing social services, or in supporting other 
income maintenance programs, given the reduced financial commitment in 
cash assistance that the proposed welfare reform offers. PBJI does not address 
this issue. These social services, such as in-kind services for the elderly, for 
child care, and for rehabilitation and prevention, are financed primarily 
through Title XX (Part A) of the Social Security Act. The federal government 
pays 75 percent of the cost of the programs for which the states are willing to 
match the other 25 percent. There is now a ceiling on the amount of Title XX 
federal funds that may be spent in each state, based on the state's proportion 
of population in the United States. Some states, such as Texas, also have 
constitutional limits on the amount of state money that may be spent for 
social services. Amendments in 1974 gave the states almost complete 
•retion in the expenditure of their allotted Title XX funds. The 
federalization of the cash assistance aspect of welfare may serve to reduce 
state commitments to social services. For every reduction of $1 of state 
funds, $3 of federal money are also removed from social service programs 
within the state. However, these social services may be necessary to achieving 
the independence from welfare that PBJI sees as its ultimate goal. The 
function of state welfare agencies, who now supply many of these services, 
may be drastically altered if there are no incentives for a state to maintain its 
efforts in this field. 
Attempts to guard against a reduction in state efforts toward social 
services will be very difficult. Social services are not entitlements, as benefits 
under the AFDC, SSI, and Food Stamp programs are. Under these programs, 
simply meeting certain eligibility criteria "entitles" a person to the receipt of 
cash benefits. On the other hand, Title XX programs provide in-kind services, 
and special additional arrangements must be made before they can be 
delivered. For example, child care institutions may have to be established. 
Quite often, the demand for such services exceeds the supply, so that some 
people who are eligible still cannot receive services. However, the state 
determines the quantity (and quality) of the supply of available social services 
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and sets the eligibility criteria. Unless Congress is willing to "revoke the 
license" of discretion it gave to the states in 1974 on the use of Title XX 
monies, there are few assurances the federal government can give for 
maintenance of state social services efforts. 
The major problem, though, is that the federal government cannot 
guarantee that its own efforts in social services will not be reduced. Congress 
determines the federal share, and there is also no assurance in PBil that the 
federal ceiling; for social services will not be lowered or simply not funded in 
response to PBil's increased federal expenditures in the cash assistance 
section of the welfare system. 
This uncertainty may also serve to deter a state from applying some of its 
fiscal relief under PBil to increasing its share of expenditures for social 
services, which would raise the state's total social services effort. If a state 
raised its share, and then the federal government were to reduce its 
proportion of aid to the programs, the state would be forced to make up the 
difference itself if it wanted to protect the interests of its social services 
recipients. Without guarantees of sustained federal efforts, expansion of social 
services by the states may not be worth the risk. 
However, it is doubtful whether there would be regional patterns of 
behavio_!_ in this aspect of welfare-type funding. One might predict that 
Southem states would tend to spend less and Northern states would spend 
more on social services, as is the case with cash assistance for welfare 
recipients. Using the condition of whether a state currently spends even the 
federal allotment for social services as a proxy measure for a state's possible 
current commitment to the provision of these services, the data indicate that 
almost the same number of states from both the North and the South tend to 
spend more than just the federal maximum allocation. Also, about equal 
numbers of states between regions spend less than is allocated to them in a 
year (see Table 5). Therefore, a state's action in this regard cannot be 
predicted on the basis of its geographical location alone. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The major goal of any welfare reform proposal, including PBJI, is the 
development of a more equitable welfare system across the country. Under 
the current program, welfare recipients in different states are not treated alike 
when in like circumstances, and different states pay different shares of the 
costs of their welfare programs. These disparities can now be grouped 
according to geographical regions: Northern states tend to pay higher benefits 
and higher shares, and.Southern states pay lower benefits and lower shares. 
Recent demographic shifts and national, state, and local financial troubles 
have highlighted this degree of regionalism in the current welfare system. The 
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TABLES 
COMPARISON OF TOTAL EXPENDITIJRES TO FEDERAL FUNDING 
ALLOCATIONS FOR STATE TITLE XX SOCIAL SERVICES 
1977 Estimate of 
Annual Title XX 1977 Federal Ratio of Expenditures 
Expenditures [a] Allocation [bf to Federal Allocations 
(millions) (millions) 
Alabama $ 45.1 $ 42.3 1.07 
Alaska 5.2 4.0 1.30 
Arizona 28.6 25.S 1.13 
Arkansas 16.3 24.4 0.66 
California 407.7 247.3 1.65 
Colorado 44.5 29.5 1.51 
Connecticut 53.8 36.5 1.42 
Delaware 8.1 6.8 1.18 
Florida 100.3 95.7 1.05 
Georgia 80.4 57.7 1.39 
Hawaii 10.0 10.0 LOO 
Idaho 24.6 9.5 2.60 
Illinois 130.4 131.7 0.99 
Indiana 12.3 63.0 0.20 
Iowa 54.0 33.8 1.60 
Kansas 31.6 26.9 1.18 
Kentucky 52.8 39.7 1.33 
Louisiana 51.4 44.5 1.15 
Maine 10.9 12.4 0.88 
Maryland N/A 48.4 N/A 
Massachusetts 63.2 68.6 0.92 
Michigan 170.8 107.6 1.59 
Minnesota 91.8 46.3 1.98 
Mississippi 7.2 27.5 0.26 
Missouri 14.1 56.5 0.25 
[a] Estimate arrived by multiplying quarterly expenditures by 4. Source: Office of 
Human Development Services, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social 
Services U.SA. , Publication No. 77-03300, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1976, p. 39. 
(b] Allocations determined by P.L. 94-401. Source: U.S. Code, Congressional and Ad-
ministrative News, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, "Legislative History of P.L. 94-401," 
St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1976, p. 2137. 
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TABLES (continued) 
COMPARISON OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES TO FEDERAL FUNDING 
ALLOCATIONS FOR STATE TITLE XX SOCIAL SERVICES 
1977 Estimate of 
Annual Title XX 1977 Federal Ratio of Expenditures 
Expenditures {a/ Allocation [bf to Federal Allocations 
(millions) (millions) 
Montana $ 15.0 $ 8.7 1.72 
Nebraska 24.4 18.3 1.36 
Nevada 6.7 6.8 0.99 
New Hampshire 11.1 9.6 1.66 
New Jersey N/A 86.7 N/A 
New Mexico 18.0 13.3 1.36 
New York 274.2 214.2 1.28 
North Carolina 13.2 63.4 0.21 
North Dakota 8.0 7.5 1.06 
Ohio 87.9 127.0 0.69 
Oklahoma 40.2 32.1 1.25 
Oregon 34.9 26.8 1.30 
Pennsylvania 78.5 140.0 0.56 
Rhode Island N/A 11.1 N/A 
South Carolina 38.0 32.9 1.15 
South Dakota 14.2 8.1 1.76 
Tennessee 36.6 48.8 0.75 
Texas 215 .6 142.5 1.15 
Utah 19.8 13.9 1.43 
Vermont 8.2 5.6 1.48 
Virginia 56.5 58.1 0.97 
Washington 50.5 41.1 1.23 
West Virginia 12.1 21.2 0.57 
Wisconsin 83.9 54.0 1.55 
Wyoming 70.0 4.3 1.65 
[a] Estimate arrived by multiplying quarterly expenditures by 4. Source: Office of 
Human Development Services, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social 
Services U.S.A., Publication No. 77-03300, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1976, p. 39. 
[b] Allocations determined by P.L. 94-401. Source: U.S. Code, Congressional and Ad-
ministrative News , 94th Congress, 2nd Session, "Legislative History of P .L. 94-401 " 
St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1976, p. 2137. ' 
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promises of fiscal relief have added a new perspective to debates of economic 
importance in the impact of welfare reform proposals. Welfare reform should 
lead to a more equitable welfare system, a system in which residence in one 
region or another will be a neutral factor in the treatment of welfare 
recipients. However, the regional variations of the current system limit the 
ability to feasibly design a fully equitable system. Given these constraints, we 
believe that the l'BJI proposal offers a realistic solution to achieving a much 
greater degree of equity in the welfare system. Therefore, we recommend that 
PBJI's major concepts relating to minimum benefit levels and state fiscal 
relief should be passed by Congress. A federally guaranteed minimum benefit 
level will reduce the disparity in benefits for welfare recipients. We would 
add, however, that PBJI should incorporate assurances that local area 
cost-of-living adjustments in benefit levels are possible and more adequately 
reflect the need of recipients. A choice of state "maintenance of effort" will 
allow a state to maximize its degree of fiscal relief and tlius reduce the 
disparity among states in proportional shares of funding their welfare 
programs. States in financial trouble need more help than PBJI will offer 
them. Yet, it can be argued that a welfare reform program that seeh·to 
provide more equitably, and to some degree more adequately, for the needs 
of the nation's poor is not the proper tool to use to try to solve all state and 
local government financial ills. Other- methods, such as revenuesharing and 
categorical and block grants, may be more appropriate measures to redress 
these fiscal problems. The achievement of a completely equitable welfare 
system may have to wait either until regional welfare ideologies move closer 
together, or until the federal government and the people feel that they are 
able and willing to devote the resources necessary to operate the welfare 
system on a truly national basis and on a level high enough to ensure 
adequacy as well as equity. 
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IMP ACT OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS 
ON THE WELFARE SYSTEM 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A sluggish economy and high unemployment have helped increase 
attention on the undocumented alien problem in the U.S. Assumptions are 
often made that millions of undocumented aliens deprive Americans of jobs, 
evade taxes, and use public semces they are not eligible for. The fact is, 
however, that there is little substantive evidence for assessing the economic 
impact undocumented aliens have on the national or regional economies. 
Despite the lack of hard data on the number of undocwnented aliens, 
various interest groups are pushing plans to control their flow into the U.S. 
As a result of their lobbying, President Carter unveiled his proposed Alien 
Adjustment and Employment Act (H. 9531, S. 2252) in August 1977. The 
legislation calls for: 
I. granting permanent resident status to undocumented aliens who 
have lived in the U.S. continuously since January I, 1970; 
2. granting five-year temporary resident status to those who entered 
the U.S. between January I, 1970 and January I, 1977; at the end 
of the five-year period, their status would be redetermined; 
3. making undocumented aliens entering after January I, 1977 subject 
to current immigration laws. 
Registration with the Immigration and Naturalization Semce {INS) would be 
required in order to obtain legal status. 
Policy Issues and Questions 
Implementation of the legislation could have profound consequences for 
the U.S., depending on the number of persons seeking permanent residence. 
Resident aliens are eligible for all public assistance programs the U.S. 
government provides. Since most undocumented aliens are assumed to fall 
into low-income categories and since it is also assumed that many of them 
will seek pennanent residence, the question arises as to what can happen 
when a large group of low-income people suddenly become eligible for public 
assistance. Thus, policymakers need to assess the number and types of 
3er'lices this group will demand in order to meet their needs. Further, they 
need to find answers to the questions, will the effects be felt by all levels of 
government? Will effects be nationwide or in specific geographic areas? 
The presence of undocumented aliens affects a wide range of issues. Some 
of these include (I) the effect of illegal aliens on the U.S. labor market, 
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particularly with respect to wage rates · and jobs displacement; (2) the 
contributions the group makes to the tax system as compared to public 
services it receives; and (3) their effect on current public assistance programs. 
Moreover, discussion of the undocumented alien also raises international 
issues such as the U.S./Mexican diplomatic relations and economic develop-
ment of border regions, among others. 
The areas to be analyzed in this section are the economic effects of 
undocumented aliens with respect to the income maintenance system and 
President Carter's proposed Program for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI). The 
primary question is what will be the costs borne by the income maintenance 
system if the new legislation passes Congress. 
Several assumptions have been made here and need to be put forth. We 
have assumed that the basic demographic characteristics of the Linton sample 
are generally applicable to the undocumented alien population (North and 
Houstoun, 1976); that undocumented aliens, particularly those from Mexico, 
tend to be workers rather than dependents; and that most studies conducted 
thus far have inflated the number and economic costs of undocumented 
aliens in the United States. 
There is sufficient evidence to assume that the impact of additional 
numbers of resident aliens would be minimal should President Carter's PBJI 
proposal receive Congressional approval. Further, even under the present 
welfare system, it is unlikely that an additional number of resident aliens 
would pose a serious burden to the welfare system. Factors such as the 
inability of undocumented aliens to prove continuous residence will 
disqualify a significant portion of them. Secondly, PBJI benefits do not 
appear to be very attractive, particularly in Texas. In addition, the 
demographic profile of the undocumented alien reveals a young, single, male 
population that is an unlikely candidate for public assistance. Finally, the 
cultural attitudes of undocumented aliens indicate they are not likely to use 
welfare services. 
INTRODUCTION 
From its inception, United States federal policy has encouraged people to 
immigrate to this country. The basic concepts of freedom and universality, as 
written in the Constitution, reflect that encouragement. During its first 100 
years the U.S. established itself as a haven for those seeking to share in the 
economic resources of this country . 
In 1875 Congress passed the first federal laws restricting open immigra-
tion. These laws contained qualitative restrictions barring prostitutes, 
convicts, the handicapped, and persons who would likely become the 
responsibility of the state. In 1882 Congress began to exclude immigrants on 
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the basis of national origin. The Chinese were first excluded, followed by the 
Japanese and finally all nonwhite Asiatics. The purpose of these laws was to 
keep America for Americans and ease the fears of laborers concerning job 
competition. These laws were replaced in 1921 with the quota system. 
Quotas for immigrants were based on the number of U.S. citizens of the same 
national origin as those applying. This-immigration policy was the forerunner 
of our present hemisphere quota system (Carlin er, 1977). 
Even though the quota system has been successful in controlling legal 
immigration, it has not been effective in reducing the number of illegal 
immigrants to the U.S. Recent economic trends such as high unemployment 
and inflation have further caused attention to focus on the effects of illegal 
immigration. On August 4, 1977, as a result of these problems, President 
Carter unveiled a plan to reduce and regulate illegal immigration. A major 
element of President Carter's plan is the provision whereby undocumented 
aliens can acquire permanent residence legal status. Considering the average 
level of education, occupation, and income of undocumented aliens, they 
could have considerable economic impact, particularly within the welfare 
system, 
Because policies are often interrelated, President Carter's plan may have 
some implications for the income maintenance and welfare systems. Of 
particular interest in this analysis are the effects of the amnesty provision to 
be granted to undocumented aliens residing in the U.S. since January l, 1970, 
on President Carter's welfare reform plan (Program for Better Jobs and 
Income) as well as its impact on the welfare system in Texas. Through 
analyzing provisions of the amnesty plan and demographic characteristics of 
undocumented aliens this analysis assessed the impact of both on the current 
and proposed welfare system in Texas. 
THE AMNESTY PLAN 
In fiscal year 1974, the Immigration and Naturalization Service reported 
that 788,000 undocumented aliens were apprehended. This is indicative of 
the substantial number of people attempting to immigrate illegally to the U.S. 
In fact, it is widely recognized that the U.S. is in the midst cf a massive illegal 
immigration trend (North and Houstoun, 1976). · 
Provisions 
In an effort to combat illegal immigration or what some have termed the 
"silent invasion," President Carter proposed the Alien Adjustment and 
Employment Act to reduce and regulate the flow of undocumented aliens 
into this country. President Carter's proposal is the product of an extensive 
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cabinet level study and work by Representatives Peter Rodino and Daniel 
Eilberg and Senators Kennedy and Eastland. It contains four main elements: 
employer sanctions, criminal charges against smugglers and job brokers, 
adjustment of status for undocumented aliens, and cooperation with source 
countries. 
In his August 4, 1977 message outlining the features of the plan, President 
Carter noted that the principal attraction for undocumented aliens is 
economic security through employment at higher wages than what workers 
could earn in their own country. President Carter maintains that restricting 
job opportunities for undocumented aliens would make illegal immigration 
less appealing and, therefore, has proposed that "Congress make unlawful the 
hiring by any employer of any undocumented alien" (President's Message, 
August 4, 1977). The Department of Justice would have responsibility for 
developing enforcement guidelines. 
Penalties for violating employment restrictions include injunctions and 
civil fines to a maximum of $1,000 for each undocumented alien the 
employer hired. Additionally, the employer is subject to criminal charges and 
possible imprisonment for violation of the injunction. While the proposed 
legislation allows the employer to defend himself against charges of hiring 
undocumented aliens, proof that the employee's documents and legal 
residence are in accordance with specifications in the Attorney General's 
regulations must be submitted. To deter falsification of documents, the plan 
states that authorized identification cards (such as Social Security) will be 
more detailed and difficult to obtain. 
Restrictions on hiring would not be the only method of limiting job 
opportunities. Persons who knowingly assist undocumented aliens in finding 
employment, primarily those who act as job brokers or as agents for 
sumgglers, will also be subject to criminal charges. 
In addition to these regulations the proposed legislation calls for 
enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act mandating payment of 
minimum wages, as well as the Act's civil and criminal penalties. This would 
ensure that aliens receive the minimum wage, and also discourage employers 
from hiring them because of higher labor costs. 
Although several states have already adopted laws concerning the hiring of 
undocumented aliens, many lack the severity and extensiveness of those 
included under the Carter plan. The Administration's plan would set uniform 
laws and sanctions for all states. 
Granting permanent resident status to illegal aliens who could prove 
continuous residence in this country since before January 1, 1970 is vital in 
order to avoid creating a subclass of people residing in the U.S. without the 
protection of the laws. Those qualifying could apply for citizenship after five 
years, according to INS regulations. Undocumented aliens living here on or 
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before January l, 1977 but after January 1, 1970 would be given temporary 
residence for five years and their immigration status would be reassessed at 
the end of that time. Also to be included in this category are those with 
expired visas, except exchange student visitors. In either case, however, an 
undocumented alien must register in order to gain new status. Persons who 
qualify for temporary alien status would have one yeai to ~egistei ar{d. could-
then reside legally in the U.S. for the next five years. The plan notes that 
establishing a temporary residency status delays the final decision on 
permanency until more accurate and reliable information concerning the 
number, concentration, family size, and economic impact of undocumented 
aliens can be collected and evaluated. The proposal calls for information 
gathering during the registration period with the final decision expected some 
time after completion of the registration process and before the five-year 
limitation expires. 
The legislation also restricts temporary aliens from voting, holding office, 
serving jury duty, and bringing their families to the U.S., though they are free 
to leave and reenter the country and seek employment under the same 
conditions as permanent resident aliens. More importantly, unlike permanent 
resident aliens, temporary residents would be barred from participating in all 
federal social services. On the other hand, allocation formulas that are based 
on population figures would be adjusted to reflect the presence of temporary 
residents in the population. 
President Carter's adjustment plan would not change the status of 
undocumented aliens entering the U.S. after January I, 1977. Similarly, 
undocumented aliens eligible for an adjustment of status but who fail to 
register with INS authorities would be subject to present immigration laws. 
President Carter's plan calls for increased cooperation in controlling illegal 
immigration with all major source countries, including increased economic aid 
in order to strengthen their economies. These measures are intended to 
discourage emigration from source countries and assumes that persons who 
may have otherwise emigrated will secure employment in their own countries. 
Although the previously discussed features of the legislation comprise the 
major elements, President Carter's proposal is not without several related 
components. One is an increase in border enforcement to ensure the 
effectiveness of the plan. President Carter has therefore proposed that 
Congress reorganize and increase by at least 2,000 the number of Border 
Patrolmen to areas where illegal entries are highest. In addition, an 
antismuggling task force would be established to reduce the effectiveness of 
smuggling rings and prosecution of those apprehended would be given high 
priority by the U.S. Attorney General. These additional measures would be 
supplemented by the State Department's increasing the number of visas 
issued abroad so as to insure a maximum number of legal entries into the 
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United States. Additionally, the State Department, together with source 
countries, would improve border patrols along mutual borders. President 
Carter has also requested that the Department of Labor {DOL) and Congress 
review the temporary worker program so that it continues to meet the needs 
of employers while simultaneously protecting domestic employment oppor-
tunities. ·· 
INTEREST GROUP REACTION 
Strong opposition to President Carter's plan has been voiced by some 
interest groups. Speaking on behalf of the Chicano community, the League of 
United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the Mexican-American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund {MALDEF) have expressed general dissatisfac-
tion with the plan. MALDEF specifically points to three major weaknesses: 
{1) the lack of hard data in compiling estimates on the number of 
undocumented aliens in the United States: {2) the employer sanctions ; and 
(3) the status adjustment provision calling for reevaluation of immigration 
status after five years. 
On the first point, MALDEF opposes the plan because the decisions that 
were made were based on estimates and information that have not been 
proven accurate. MALDEF contends that reliable estimates and information 
are the only basis for sound projections about aliens and development of a 
rational policy. Therefore, MALDEF has charged that the Administration's 
plan merely clouds the issue. 
MALDEF believes the employer sanctions will result in job discrimination 
against Chicanos. They note that some employers, in their overanxious efforts 
to obey the law, will refuse to hire Chicanos, regardless of their proof of 
citizenship. They also contend that these restrictions give employers unwilling 
to hire Chicanos a reason not to. 
Objections by MALDEF as to the adjustment component are primarily 
because the cut-off dates were arbitrarily chosen. They believe these dates 
will cause many aliens who have economically contributed to our society and 
developed close ties with communities to be assigned temporary resident alien 
status. This, MALDEF contends, would create a subclass of residents. The 
danger inherent in this is that the negative attitudes toward this segment of 
the population could easily be transferred to Chicanos as there is no obvious 
difference between Mexican undocumented aliens and Chicanos. 
On the other hand, some groups have been supportive of President Carter's 
plan. The American labor movement, with the exception of the American 
Farm Workers, is favorably disposed to the plan. AFL-CIO President Goerge 
Meany issued a statement urging swift passage of legislation as proposed in 
President Carter's plan. 
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Labor union support is understandable in that union responsibility is to 
protect the jobs of its members. In fact, union leaders have stated that the 
number of undocumented aliens in this country is exactly equal to the 
number ofunemployed Americans. They feel that undocumented workers are 
likely to take not only low-paying jobs but any type of employment 
available. They view the plan as sharply curtailing the number of undocumen-
ted aliens competing for jobs against Americans. This is perhaps why they 
have also vigorously supported the employer hiring restrictions. 
Another important consequence of President Carter's plan envisioned by 
labor leaders is the provision calling for stricter enforcement of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. In the view of labor, this would eventually result in the 
unionization of areas such as the Rio Grande Valley in Texas and would 
constitute the opening of a new frontier for the labor movement (Schey, 
1977). 
THE UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN 
Who is the undocumented alien? In order to determine the impact 
President Carter's amnesty proposal will have on the income maintenance 
system, it is necessary to first determine the characteristics and needs of 
undocumented aliens. Demographic profiles and related data found in several 
recent studies provide an empirical base for assessing the contributions 
undocumented aliens make to the U.S., as well as the costs they impose on 
this country. Research on undocumented aliens includes the Linton study 
(North and Houstoun, 1976), the County of San Diego study of 1977, and 
ongoing research being conducted by J.A. Reyes & Associates and the U.S. 
Civil Rights Commission. 
The Linton study contains the most comprehensive data yet compiled, 
although results are "soft," given the nature of the research. The survey was 
conducted in nineteen cities and includes a sample of 793 apprehended illegal 
aliens. The authors' sample consisted of 481 (61 percent) Mexicans, 237 (30 
percent) nationals from other Western Hemisphere (WH) nations, and 75 (9 
percent) nationals from Eastern Hemisphere (EH) nations. 
The very fact that researchers conducting studies on undocumented aliens 
are trying to measure an unlawful activity precludes an accurate represen-
tation of this segment of the population. Further, because the exact number 
of undocumented aliens is unknown, most studies to date, including the 
Linton and San Diego studies, have used apprehended illegals to draw their 
sample. While variations of sample selections have been tried in recent studies, 
no firm conclusions can be drawn from the results and the findings cannot be 
inferred on the undocumented alien population. At best, the studies 
conducted thus far give a very general portrait of the undocumented alien 
population as implied by the sample. 
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Demographic Profile of Undocumented Aliens 
According to the Linton study, the "typical" illegal alien is thought to be 
a young, single male with limited English-speaking ability, poorly educated, 
and in search of employment. The authors of the Linton study conclude that 
these characteristics hold true although they can vary substantially depending 
on the nationality of the undocumented alien. 
In preparing the amnesty legislation proposal, the Carter Administration 
tried to distinguish between undocumented aliens who live in the U.S. 
permanently and those here on a temporary basis. According to the San 
Diego County study , 53 percent of the 217 apprehended undocumented 
aliens indicated that their preferred choice of residence was their own 
country (Mexico). They pointed at the lack of economic opportunity in their 
home country as the reason for migrating to the U.S. On the other hand, 39 
percent preferred living in the U.S. permanently, while 3 percent were 
undecided and 4 percent did not answer. 
Many people assume that the undocumented alien problem is really one of 
Mexicans crossing the border and working in fields of the Southwest. This is 
no longer so . Undocumented aliens are settling primarily in urban areas 
throughout the country. They tend to settle in communities where there are 
already large numbers of permanent resident aliens , sixty-nine percent of 
them concentrating in only six states-California, New York, Texas, Illinois, 
New Jersey, and Florida. Mexicans still tend to settle in the Southwest, 
particularly in California and Texas, but they have been moving in increasing 
number to the Midwest and Northwest metropolitan areas. WH undocu-
mented aliens other than Mexicans usually settle along the East Coast, as do 
those from the EH. The Midwest and Northwest urban areas trail the East 
Coast as favored settlement areas. 
The overall educational level of undocumented aliens varied from the 4.9 
average years of schooling for Mexicans to the 11.9 average years of schooling 
for EH respondents. The latter group's education level is comparable to that 
of the U.S. labor force average of 12.4 years. EH undocumented aliens as a 
group are well-educated, obtain better jobs, are more likely to speak English, 
and are better able to adapt to American life. Therefore, they are less likely 
to be apprehended by the INS. 
The Linton study also described the "typical" undocumented alien as 
young, male, and single. Almost 91 percent of their respondents were male, 
averaging 28.5 years of age. The. men were much more likely to be single than 
their American counterparts. Only about 16 percent of American males aged 
25-34 are single, while almost 37 percent of the sample group in this age 
bracket were single. 
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Although most apprehended undocumented aliens are single, as a group 
they support an average of 4.6 dependents in their home country. The 
number of dependents varied from an average of 1.8 dependents for EH 
undocumented aliens to 5.4 in the case of those from Mexico. Although the 
average gross weekly earnin~ of the Linton sample were $120, this group 
managed to send home an average of $105 per month. Again, there was a 
substantial variance, with Mexicans sending home $129 per month and WH 
and EH undocumented aliens sending $76 and $3 7 respectively. 
As a group, only one-sixth of the Linton sample reported their spouses 
living in the U.S., and one-eighth had their children with them. Significantly, 
21.3 percent of the EH undocumented aliens and 27.8 percent of those from 
the WH reported their spouses living with them, while only 11 percent of the 
Mexican sample reported their spouses living in this country, regardless of the 
proximity to Mexico. On the other hand, Mexicans had more relatives in the 
United States than any other group. 
Undocumented aliens are more likely to be workers than dependents and, 
therefore, their biggest impact on society is in the labor market. It is also 
interesting to compare pre-immigration occupations with the jobs held by 
undocumented aliens once they reach the U.S. North and Houstoun's study 
found that Mexicans generally had increasing upward mobility as they 
switched from fann labor or unskilled labor positions to semi-skilled jobs. On 
the other hand, WH and EH undocumented aliens in particular shifted 
downward from white collar to service occupations in the U.S. 
The number of undocumented aliens working in the U.S. is still unknown, 
while information gathered reflects projections based on those who are 
apprehended. The INS estimated that in 1975 1.1 million out of a total of 1.7 
million undocumented aliens in the Western region of the U.S. (Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, San Diego, Imperial Valley, Phoenix, and Hawaii) were 
working. However, figures tend to vary considerably. For example, in 1974 
San Diego County officials estimated that out of 1.3 million undocumented 
aliens in California, only 251,000 were working. An assumption made about 
undocumented aliens in the work force is that they depress wages for U.S. 
workers in comparable positions given their willingness to work longer hours 
for less pay and fewer or no fringe benefits. The Linton study determined 
that the average hourly pay varied greatly depending on the nationality of the 
undocumented alien and the location. The average hourly wage of Mexicans 
was $2.71 while WH and EH undocumented aliens earned $3.05 and $4.08 
respectively. On the East Coast, the average wage was $3 .29 per hour, while 
in the Midwest and Northwest it was $3.18. In California the average wage 
was $2.60, while in the Southwestern states it only averaged $1.98. In 1975 
the average hourly wage for U.S. production and nonsupervisory workers was 
$4.54. However, the federal minimum wage for agricultural workers was only 
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$1.80 per hour and $2.00 per hour for nonagricultural workers . 
The apprehended undocumented aliens also were shown to work longer 
hours than their U.S. counterparts in the work force. In the contract 
construction industry, undocumented aliens worked 42.8 hours compared to 
37.l hours per week for American workers. The average work week for 
undocumented aliens in sales was 43.4 hours to 33.6 hours by American 
coworkers. In the manufacturing sector, undocumented aliens averaged 41.2 
hours per week versus 39 hours registered by their American counterparts. 
The widest gap existed in the services sector, where undocumented aliens 
worked an average of 45 hours, compared to 33.7 hours by American 
workers. 
Contributions/Costs to Society 
Up to now there is no evidence that undocumented aliens use public 
services in the U.S. to any significant degree. On the contrary, because of 
their illegal status, undocumented aliens are not apt to use any services except 
medical services in cases of extreme need. 
Several studies have been conducted on the costs of undocumented aliens 
to the U.S., all varying in quality and reliability. In 1975, ICF, Inc., a public 
policy consulting firm in Washington, D.C., prepared a study for the INS 
encompassing both direct costs, such as unemployment compensation, 
welfare, food stamps, and Medicaid, and indirect costs such as tax evasion, 
balance of payments loss, and job displacement caused by undocumented 
aliens. ICF reported that for every one million adult undocumented aliens, 
there is a presumed net tax burden of approximately $2 billion. ICF's final 
figure indicates a yearly loss to the U.S. of $13 billion or more . 
The AFL-CIO estimated that the annual wage loss to American workers 
due to undocumented aliens is around $10 billion . These figures assumed that 
two million workers were displaced at an average annual wage of $5,000. 
The Linton and San Diego studies assessed the impact of the undocu-
mented aliens through their contribution to the tax system and public 
services received. Unfortunately, both studies ignored the cost of job 
displacement. Table 6, from the Linton study, makes a viable case for 
defending the undocumented aliens' presence in the U.S. 
The San Diego study (Villalpando, 1977) estimated that the annual tax 
contribution of undocumented aliens in San Diego County is $48.8 million. 
Welfare costs are more difficult to estimate , but it is likely that the use of 
welfare services by undocumented aliens is minimal. Application procedures 
developed in San Diego County in 1975 prompted the decrease of 
undocumented aliens on AFDC from 193 cases ($24,036 per month) in May 
1976 to 28 cases ($3,487 per month) in December 1976. These figures 
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TABLE6 
EXTENT OF PARTICIPATION OF 
APPREHENDED UNOOCUMEN'ff;D ALIEN RESPONDENTS 
IN TAX-PAYING AND TAX-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS 
Program Activity 
Input 
Social security taxes withheld 
Federal income taxes withheld 
Hospitali7.ation payments withheld 
Filed U.S. income tax returns 
Output 
Used hospitals or clinics 
Collected one or more weeks of 
unemployment insurance 
Have children in U.S. schools 
Participated in U .S.-funded job training programs 
Secured food stamps 
Secured welfare payments 
Percent of 
Respondent Participation 
773 
73.2 
44.0 
31.5 
27.4 
3.9 
3.7 
1.4 
1.3 
0.5 
Source: David S. North and Marion F. Houstoun, The Characteristics and 
Role of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market: An Exploratory 
Study (Washington, D.C.: Linton and Company, 1976). 
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demonstrate the minimal impact undocumented aliens have on welfare costs. 
The largest cost imposed by them is on health services. 
IMPACT OF PLAN 
Assessing the impact undocumented aliens would have on Texas welfare 
programs is a difficult task given that available studies do not provide 
evidence to support or refute allegations (1) that there are large numbers of 
undocumented aliens, (2) that these same aliens take jobs from Americans, 
and (3) that they use public services without paying taxes. Even seemingly 
sound data and estimates must be carefully scrutinized. 
For example, some estimates reveal faulty or unreasonable assumptions. 
INS Commissioner Leonel Castillo estimates that four million undocumented 
aliens are presen dy in the U.S. INS' low estimates may have been inspired by 
a desire to make President Carter's proposal more acceptable. In other words, 
the lower the number of undocumented aliens the less significant their impact 
on American society. On the other hand, a general feeling of hysteria has 
caused some estimates to be very high, as some observers blame the present 
economic conditions of the U.S. on undocumented aliens. 
On the other hand, the Lesko study conducted for the INS in 1975 
estimated there were 8.2 million persons residing illegally in the U.S. Prior to 
this study, INS had reported as low an estimate as 2.5 million undocumented 
aliens. In arriving at their estimate, the Lesko group used a formula based on 
several questionable assumptions: (I) that illegal immigration is consistently 
related to the number of aliens apprehended at points other than at entry and 
that this ratio remained constant from 1960 until the time of the study;(2) 
the number of persons missed in the 1970 Census of Mexico equaled the 
number of persons missed in the 1960 Census; (3) all emigration from Mexico 
was to the U.S.; and (4) the U.S. Census data for 1960 and 1970 on ''country 
of birth," particularly for Mexico, are accurate and consistent (Congressional 
Record, 1976). 
1be question then arises, who is closest to the actual truth? Professor 
Walter Fogel in October of 1977 in questioning the validity of the I.esko 
study said: 
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My own view is that these figures which are now being used in INS 
press releases, err significantly on the high side. It is hard to believe that 
there are almost as many illegal Mexicans in the U.S. as there are lawful 
Mexican-origin residents (6.7 million as estimated by the Census Bureau 
in 1975). It is also hard to believe that roughly 40% of all males aged 
15-44 who lived in Mexico in 1970 migrated to the U.S. by 1975 ... as is 
implied in the estimates INS is not using. (Briggs, Fogel, Schmitt, 
1977 .) 
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Fogel attributes these high estimates to a failure to account for the flow of 
people back into Mexico, either after not finding employment or simply 
returning home. 
Although Fogel's reasoning is logical it still does not answer the question 
of how many undocumented aliens there are and of how the flow of 
Mexican-origin persons compares with that of persons from other Latin 
American nations. 
Participation Under Plan 
INS Commissioner Castillo noted in August 1977 that between three to 
five million persons will register in one of the two categories under the Carter 
amnesty plan. hi addition, approximately 500,000 undocumented aliens will 
apply for permanent resident status, but this total will not include a majority 
of Mexican applicants. Figures for undocumented aliens seeking temporary 
status fall between 2.5 and 4.5 million, half of them being Mexican born. The 
remainder will most likely have two options: be subjected to current 
immigration laws if they wish to legalize their status; or continue their 
clandestine lifestyles, given their mistrust of INS. Overall, these registration 
estimates are quite optimistic. For example, Canada undertook an amnesty 
plan in 1977 and after much preregistration fanfare about the expected one 
million registrants, only 50,000 undocumented aliens actually registered. If 
INS estimates are accurate, however, undocumented aliens could have some 
effect on the Texas welfare system and that of other Southwestern states. 
However, the impact undocumented aliens will have on national welfare 
programs will probably be relatively small. This assumption is based on the 
fact that the 500,000 undocumented aliens who will supposedly apply for 
permanent residence are the only group eligible for welfare benefits, as 
temporary residents will be restricted from federal programs. The second 
factor leading to this conclusion is three-fold: (1) the number of permanent 
residents who have been in the U.S. for at least seven and one-half years and 
are already receiving welfare benefits is not only small but will not make an 
additional impact; (2) among the new permanent residents there will be a 
number of persons who will not seek public assistance because of their desire 
to maintain low profiles; and (3) it is reasonable to assume that those who 
have been here since 1970 have survived on their own and will most likely not 
seek welfare benefits. 
Similar uncertainties arise when the effects of undocumented aliens are 
evaluated on a state level. In 1977 the Texas Department of Human 
Resources (DHR) estimated that the total number of undocumented aliens in 
the state was approximately 800,000. At present, however, the Department is 
more inclined to estimate the number in Texas as falling between 300,000 
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and 500,000. In either case arguments for both estimates can be defended 
considering the makeup of undocumented aliens, the population, and the 
proximity of Texas to Mexico. 
DHR also estimated that 40 percent of the undocumented aliens in Texas 
were residents prior to 1970, making the potential number of eligible welfare 
recipients about 320,000 persons (assuming the 800,000 figure). In addition, 
DHR estimated that 64,000 of the 320,000 undocumented aliens already 
belong to families in Texas and that the remaining 256,000 would become 
permanent residents and choose Texas as a home base. Further, DHR 
predicted only 5 percent of the new permanent residents would bring their 
families to Texas given the freedom of traveling to and from Mexico, allowing 
for frequent visits. The cost-of-living differential would further discourage 
new permanent residents from bringing their families over. It is also assumed 
that while families have lived apart, different lifestyles will have been formed, 
making conciliations less likely. DHR's final assumption was that breaking 
cultural ties with the home country may be viewed as undesirable, thus 
convincing those who migrate to the U.S. to leave their families in Mexico. 
The assumptions made by Texas DHR seem valid and are shared by Jorge 
Bustamante, sociologist at El Colegio de Mexico and one of the leading 
experts on Mexican migration. Professor Bustamante maintains that upward 
mobility for the Mexican undocumented alien will come most rapidly if the 
worker's family stays in Mexico, given the increased real income the family 
will receive as a factor of cost-of-living differences. This fact should result in 
few registrants bringing their families to the U.S. 
Impact on Current Social Service Programs 
This section provides a brief description of the major welfare programs in 
order to determine who is served by current social services and what the 
likelihood is that newly registered aliens will be eligible. 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The AFDC program provides a 
minimal level of income to families with dependent children. AFDC 
payments in Texas are limited almost exclusively to female-headed families 
while eligible male applicants are generally disabled, in poor health, or aged. 
Although DHR estimated in 1977 that 8 percent of newly registered aliens or 
2,300 persons would participate, it no longer stands firmly by this figure. 
Food Stamps. The Food Stamp program allows low income persons and 
families to receive coupons enabling them to increase their food purchase 
capacity. Low income and U.S. citizenship or permanent resident status 
guidelines are the only requirements for participation, making this the most 
accessible program for indigents. Iii. September 1977 DHR projected 3,744 
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alien families would re~ter and participate but again no longer stands by this 
figure. 
General Assistance. General assistance is a small program providing 
emergency benefits to persons pending participation in federal programs. The 
program is available in only a few localities across Texas and usually reaches 
only those cases most in need. Undocumented aliens will not be served in 
large numbers through general assistance even if they become permanent 
residents. 
Medical Assistance. DHR administers the Texas Medical Assistance 
program, which includes Medicaid. Services are generally limited to current 
welfare recipients, nursing home patients, and the medically indigent. These 
requirements plus strict U.S. citizenship requirements now exclude undocu-
mented aliens by definition. 
Supplemental Security Income. SSI provides income to individuals aged 
sixty-five or over, or those who are blind or disabled and who do not qualify 
of OASDI payments. It seems unlikely that many undocumented aliens fit 
this description or will in the near future. 
Unemployment Insurance. The Unemployment Insurance program, .ad-
ministered by the Texas Employment Commission, provides income for 
workers who are unemployed. This form of insurance is financed from a 
payroll tax and covers most occupations. Therefore, citizenship is not a 
requirement and at present undocumented aliens are eligible if they work in a 
job covered by the program (U.S. Department of Justice, 1976). 
Although there may be a large increase in the participation of newly 
permanent resident aliens in contrast to their past participation in these 
programs, the overall effect would appear to be minimal. This conclusion can 
be substantiated by viewing the current number of AFDC caseloads in Texas. 
DHR reports 94,000 current AFDC cases and an approximate addition of 
2,300 new cases, raising that figure slightly without a noticeable increase in 
costs. The same holds true for the Food Stamp program, as the present 
caseload of 225 ,000 households (individuals included) would only be 
increased by approximately 35,000 new households, or more specifically, 
47,000 individual recipients. These figures are only "guesstimates," and since 
the time they were developed DHR has downplayed their significance. Thus, 
the general consensus is that there will be far fewer increases than reported 
above and that the overall impact will be slight. 
Eligibility for most public assistance programs depends upon U.S. 
citizenship status, and the various state agencies in Texas as well as most 
others across the U.S. have verification procedures to effectively screen out 
undocumented aliens. In addition, although generalizations cannot be made 
based on the profile of undocumented aliens, it appears they are not likely to 
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fit the characteristics of the public assistance recipient population. The 
undocumented alien population seems to be overwhelmingly young (70 
percent under 30), male, single , and employed. Further, although much of 
this group can be classified as low income, the predominance of single males 
makes the match of populations an ill-fitted one (U.S. Department of Justice, 
1976). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Carter amnesty plan will have mi,nimal impact on the present public 
assistance system or on a reformed welfare system since it strictly stipulates 
that only those undocumented aliens living in the U.S. prior to January 1, 
1970 are eligible for public assistance. Moreover, the greatest portion of 
undocumented aliens, the temporary resident aliens, will be barred from 
participation in welfare programs. Therefore , this means that only about 
500,000 people nationwide, citing INS estimates, would be eligible. Of those 
eligible to register as permanent residents, some will not do so because they 
are unable to prove they have been continuous residents since prior to 
January 1, 1970. Others will not register due to suspicion and fear of 
interaction with INS. If the aim of government officials is to persuade this 
group to register, extensive outreach campaigns will need to be conducted. 
Furthermore, since most undocumented aliens from Mexico have language 
difficulties , outreach campaigns are crucial and must be directed in a way that 
will effectively reach these groups. Thus, there is a need to have outreach 
workers who speak proficient Spanish. 
Moreover, of those who register as permanent residents, few will apply for 
welfare benefits. Based on the demogaphic profile of the undocumented alien 
population, it is unlikely that they will be eligible for any benefits in most 
current programs. 
Some observers have worried about the ramifications of dividing undocu-
mented aliens into two groups-one with the rights and privileges of U.S. 
citizens, and another virtually stripped of those same rights and privileges. 
There is really no conflict, however, as the U.S. admits hundreds of thousands 
of aliens to l\r in this country on a temporary basis. 
The above conclusions notwithstanding, there remains the question of 
alien status beyond the five-year temporary resident period. There is a 
likelihood that these persons could become permanent residents with all the 
privileges that status brings ; but this status is little different from that of 
other undocumented aliens except in length of residence. If the status of 
temporary residents should change, there is little reason to anticipate 
anything but minimal increases in public assistance program participation . 
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The Texas Constitution limits the amount of state monies that ca.ii. be 
spent on welfare, and although the programs' spending is well below ceiling 
levels, the legislature has been unwilling to raise state spending. This makes 
public assistance payments in Texas among the lowest in the nation; the 
average AFDC monthly payment in 1976 was $105. With the passage of 
President Carter's PWI program, poor Texas families would be guaranteed an 
income set at . 65% of the poverty level with little chance of state 
supplementation-hardly an incentive for additional people to enter the 
public assistance system. Therefore, it is unlikely there will be much change 
in the participation levels of Texas residents in the advent of PWI and the 
passage of the amnesty legislation affecting undocumented aliens. The same 
cannot be assumed for other states, as the bulk of undocumented aliens are 
assumed to live in a few mostly high-benefit states, primarily California, New 
York, New leISey, Illinois, and Massachusetts, where a PWI federal income 
floor set at 65 percent of poverty is almost certain to be raised to the poverty 
level by state supplementation. 
Under PBJI not only will two-parent families be eligible for assistance, but 
also single individuals unable to find a full-time job. The possibility of 
significant numbers of single undocumented aliens participating does not 
seem likely, however, as the maximum federal benefits would be $1,100 per 
year and they cease when full-time work is found. 
- There is . a· basic diSincentive fodar~-Scale participation because of tlie 
presumed lack of a family structure . present in the undocumented alien 
population in the U.S. Married men who register as permanent residents 
would be allowed to bring their families into the U.S., but not many are 
expected to do so. Further, the largest group of undocumented aliens whom 
the Linton study found to have families in this country were from the 
Eastern Hemisphere. These are not likely to inflate welfare rolls significantly 
since they are well-educated, tend to have better jobs than other undocumen-
ted aliens, and generally earn an hourly wage above the poverty level. 
Initially, there seem to be good incentives for aliens to participate in PBTI 
in high-benefit states. The program promises that by 1981 families with a 
working household head will receive an income 13-20 percent above the 
poverty level while workers learn new skills to improve their position in a 
competitive labor market. The bulk of undocumented aliens could certainly 
use the higher income and skills training, but the key to why few are 
expected to participate is the expectations this population has of the 
·government. The relatively smaller population from the Eastern Hemisphere 
includes persons accustomed to fairly sophisti~a~d social service delivery 
systems and who consequently have ingrained attitudes that governments do 
provide help for their poor. The Linton study and others have shown that EH 
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undocumented aliens are slightly more likely to use social services, while their 
Mexican and other Western hemisphere counterparts were reared in nations 
with either no system or very limited public assistance. As a result, the 
undocumented aliens are likely to be unaware of the types of assistance 
available and, if aware of the services offered, their background may lead 
them to reject automatically the notion of government help. Undocumented 
aliens are used to providing for themselves and doubtless there is much pride 
in their self-reliance. While there will be continuing debate on the Carter 
amnesty proposal, the evidence available indicates that undocumented aliens 
have not been and are not likely to place undue burdens on the welfare 
system. 
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